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INTRODUCTION
Although the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Citi-
zens United v. Federal Election Commission' clearly controls the First
Amendment rights of corporations, the effect of Citizens United on cor-
porate criminal liability is less obvious, though equally (if not more)
* University of Pennsylvania Law School, J.D., 2008; University of Chicago, B.A., 2005.
The author is a law clerk for the Honorable Helene N. White, United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit. The views expressed in the Article are solely those of the author.
1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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significant. The Court's view that corporations are equal to human
beings, at least under the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause,2 when
combined with the traditional understanding that corporations are con-
sidered "persons" under the United States Constitution,' likely impacts
the way that corporations' alleged misdeeds are investigated by the gov-
ernment and the manner in which the government subsequently deals
with corporate misconduct, specifically through deferred-prosecution
agreements and non-prosecution agreements.
In particular, certain provisions that are typically included in
deferred- and non-prosecution agreements may have to be altered or
eliminated from use altogether in the wake of Citizens United.' Another
result prompted by Citizens United could be the implementation of judi-
cial oversight over deferred- and non-prosecution agreements, which
would include the submission of all such agreements to federal courts
for approval and the provision of an opportunity for a corporation to be
heard if the government makes a unilateral claim of breach. Undoubt-
edly, these changes would greatly alter the landscape of corporate crimi-
nal liability in the United States.
Part I of the Article provides an introduction to the concept of cor-
porate criminal liability, with Section A describing the courts' approach,
Section B providing an overview of the commentators' approach, and
Section C detailing the government's approach-including overall cor-
porate charging and sentencing policy. Part II explores the government's
use of deferred-prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agree-
ments, and courts' and commentators' views on such agreements. Part
III examines the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United. Finally,
Part IV enumerates the ways in which Citizens United potentially affects
the above-described approaches to corporate criminal liability and out-
2. See id. at 900 ("Under the rationale of these precedents, political speech does not lose
First Amendment protection 'simply because its source is a corporation."' (quoting First Nat'l
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978))); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("The identity of the speaker is not
decisive in determining whether speech is protected. Corporations and other associations, like
individuals, contribute to the 'discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas'
that the First Amendment seeks to foster." (quoting Bellotti, 435 U. S. at 783)).
3. See Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) ("The Court does not
wish to hear argument ... [regarding] whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, applies to . . . corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does."); see
also Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-dimensional Approach to the
Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CoRP. & FiN. L. 97, 116 (2009) (indicating that
"the Supreme Court has ... held that corporations are entitled to various liberty rights under the
Constitution"). See generally Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the
Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGs L.J. 577 (1990) (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning
corporate guarantees under the Bill of Rights).
4. See infra Part IV.
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lines resulting changes with respect to the government's treatment of
corporate criminality.
I. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Below, the Article explores the approaches of courts, commenta-
tors, and the government to corporate criminal liability. Additionally,
with respect to the government's treatment of corporate criminality, the
Article discusses the government's charging policy, its use of deferred-
prosecution agreements ("DPAs") and non-prosecution agreements
("NPAs"), and the courts' views on such agreements.
A. Approach of Courts
Establishing corporate criminal liability is currently a matter of
straightforward black-letter law: "A corporation is liable for the criminal
misdeeds of its agents acting within the actual or apparent scope of their
employment or authority if the agents intend, at least in part, to benefit
the corporation, even though their actions may be contrary to corporate
policy or express corporate order."' Because corporations are artificial
creations, they can be "held liable for the conduct of their employees
only vicariously, through the venerable [tort law] doctrine of respondeat
superior: 'Let the master answer.' "6
Despite having its roots in tort law, the notion of corporate criminal
liability, as courts have applied it, advances both the deterrence and just-
desert notions of criminal law. For example, in New York Central &
Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court of the
United States emphasized the need for deterrence of institutional wrong-
5. JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS 202 (2d
ed. 2003); see also United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674-75 (1975) (noting that for a corporate
officer to be held accountable for his failure to act on behalf of the corporation, the government
must introduce sufficient evidence that would "warrant a finding ... that the defendant had, by
reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first
instance, or promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and that he failed to do so"); N.Y.
Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493-94 (1909) (citations omitted)
(indicating that it has been "well established that, in actions for tort, the corporation may be held
responsible for damages for the acts of its agent within the scope of his employment" and
explaining that a "corporation is held responsible for acts not within the agent's corporate powers
strictly construed, but which the agent has assumed to perform for the corporation when
employing the corporate powers actually authorized").
6. Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal
Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1563 (1990)
(citation omitted). The tort-law doctrine of respondeat superior imposes liability on employers for
the conduct of their employees because this is "the most convenient and efficient way of ensuring
that persons injured in the course of business enterprises do not go uncompensated." Id. at
1563-64 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Tort-law scholars have also
suggested that "employer liability creates an incentive for management to take precautions to
prevent employee accidents." Id. at 1566.
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doing in holding that "to give [corporations] immunity from all punish-
ment because of the old and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot
commit a crime would virtually take away the only means of effectually
controlling the subject-matter and correcting the abuses aimed at."7
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.' further explained that
the imposition of criminal liability upon corporations is designed to
"stimulat[e] a maximum effort by owners and managers to assure adher-
ence by such agents to the requirements of the [law]."9 The Hilton court
pointed out that "the strenuous efforts of corporate defendants to avoid
conviction . . . strongly suggests that Congress is justified in its judg-
ment that exposure of the corporate entity to potential conviction may
provide a substantial spur to corporate action to prevent violations by
employees."'o
Courts have also indicated that, in addition to the theory of deter-
rence, the criminal-law notion of just-desert supports the imposition of
corporate criminal liability. For instance, in United States v. Park, the
Supreme Court held that a company could be a blameworthy actor
deserving of criminal punishment, just like an individual wrongdoer."
This suggestion had been advanced by the Court in previous decisions,
where it posited that "it is elementary that such impersonal entities [as
corporations and other associations] can be guilty of 'knowing' or 'will-
ful' violations of regulatory statutes"' 2 because, through their structures
and internal organization, they encourage or neglect to prevent individ-
ual employee wrongdoing."
7. N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 495-96; see also Park, 421 U.S. at 672 ("[I]n providing sanctions
which reach and touch the individuals who execute the corporate mission ... the [Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act] imposes not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy violations when
they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement measures that will insure that violations
will not occur.").
8. 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972).
9. Id. at 1005.
10. Id. at 1006 (citation omitted).
11. See Park, 421 U.S. at 673 (indicating that corporate entities should be punished for not
putting measures into place that would prevent criminal conduct on behalf of their employees).
12. United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 125 (1958).
13. See Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating
Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REv. 849, 889-90 (2007) (stating that "corporations, even if they
do not possess a human capacity for shame, have discrete identities and expressive potential that
renders them capable of suffering moral condemnation, 'thereby vindicating the proper valuation
of persons and goods whose true worth was disparaged by the corporation's conduct-just as in
the case of an individual wrongdoer.'" (quoting Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 833, 852 (2000))). Thus, as Professor Pamela
Bucy suggests, corporations can and should be held criminally liable pursuant to the criminal-law
theory of just-desert when their systems of social structures and internal organizational
processes-the corporate "ethos"-encourage or fail to discourage unlawful behavior. See
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B. Approach of Commentators
Although the doctrine of respondeat superior has been extended to
the realm of corporate criminal prosecutions because of the widespread
"belief that a broad standard is needed to combat the organizational
roots of white collar crime," 14 there are obvious differences between tort
law and criminal law. Thus, there is much debate about whether the
theory of vicarious liability is the proper vehicle for the criminalization
of corporate conduct. As some commentators have pointed out, "'[t]ort
law distributes the loss of a harmful occurrence' but criminal law
'coerc[es] the actual or potential wrongdoer to compliance with the set
standards of society through the threat or applications of sanctions."15
Furthermore, "a standard modeled on respondeat superior departs from
the 'basic premise of criminal jurisprudence that guilt requires personal
fault.' "16
Despite the tensions surrounding the application of tort-law princi-
ples to a criminal-law concept, a number of scholars have persuasively
argued that deterrence principles justify the current expansive doctrines
supporting corporate vicarious liability for the actions of corporate
agents. For example, Brent Fisse indicates that corporations can be prop-
erly characterized as criminally responsible agents because such con-
demnation is not symbolic, but instead addresses "the fact that people
within the organization collectively failed to avoid the offense to which
corporate blame attaches."" Moreover, Fisse argues that criminal liabil-
ity works in the corporate context because corporations, like individuals,
can feel stigmatized by the imposition of this form of punishment. While
the imposition of criminal sanctions on individuals makes them feel like
outcasts, causing them to continue their socially deviant behavior, "cor-
porations are more likely to react positively to criminal stigma by
attempting to repair their images and regain public confidence."' 8
generally Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal
Liability, 75 Mum. L. REv. 1095 (1991).
14. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 6, at 1573. Such a broad standard is necessary, in
theory, because white-collar criminal activity arises from
pressures exerted by the corporation, which is more likely to enforce its penalties
than the government is to bring criminal prosecutions. Consequently, the most
accepted basis for corporate criminal liability is the need to deter misconduct. A
corollary to this view is that criminal liability will encourage better supervision of
employee conduct.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
15. Id. at 1572 (citation omitted).
16. Id. (citation omitted).
17. Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and
Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1141, 1149 (1983).
18. Id. at 1154. As Fisse suggests, corporations have monetary as well as nonmonetary goals.
Thus, the imposition of purely monetary civil penalties may not deter corporations from
2010] 5
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Imposing criminal liability on corporations not only serves criminal
law's goal of deterrence, but also it furthers its aims of rehabilitation and
incapacitation. As Fisse notes, "organizational offenders cannot exert
self-control merely by individual self-denial. . . . [Instead, their self-
denial] must be embodied in corporate policy and backed by appropriate
disciplinary measures and . . . procedures."' 9 Punishment or the threat of
punishment, when imposed on corporations, can lead to a number of
positive changes, which are not typically evoked from individual offend-
ers, such as the establishment and strengthening of compliance strate-
gies, the catalyzation of internal discipline controls, and the modification
of standard operating procedures.20
Other scholars argue that corporate criminal liability advances the
criminal-law principle of just-desert-the notion that it is morally
acceptable to punish blameworthy individuals in proportion to the sever-
ity of their crimes.2 1 Professor Julie Rose O'Sullivan contends that
"there are two .. . ways in which an entity may be deemed 'responsible'
in a causal sense for its agents' . . . misconduct. First, [an entity] may
fail to put in place organizational policies or practices sufficient to pre-
vent certain types of . .. misconduct. . . . Second, [an entity] may pos-
sess a bad "culture" or "ethos," which may . . . [encourage employee
wrongdoing]."22 O'Sullivan admits that it is difficult to identify when
the corporation as a whole, as opposed to the individuals making up the
corporation, "should be identified as the 'culprit.' "23 However, she
argues that this problem can be resolved if corporate liability is only
imposed when the corporation's "culture, policies or procedures
[clearly] caused, encouraged, or condoned the misconduct at issue."
O'Sullivan also attacks two related objections to the imposition of
criminal liability on corporations: the unfairness of penalizing innocent
committing criminal acts through their employees. In particular, "the value of corporate prestige in
modem business suggests the relevance of stigmatization. In addition to the stigmatic potential of
conviction and informal publicity in the media, it is conceivable that corporate convictions might
be publicized by formal, court-ordered publicity sanctions, thereby increasing the stigma
imposed." Id. at 1155.
19. Id. at 1160.
20. See id.
21. See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 197 (arguing that "corporations can be blameworthy
actors upon whom retributive punishment is appropriately imposed").
22. Julie Rose O'Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to Professor
Schneyer's Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmics 1, 28-29 (2002); see also Susanna M. Kim,
Characteristics of Soulless Persons: The Applicability of the Character Evidence Rule to
Corporations, 2000 U. I.L. L. REv. 763, 803 (2000) (footnote omitted) ("The corporation may not
have a soul, but it can be held morally responsible for its actions and its decisionmaking
structure.").
23. O'Sullivan, supra note 22, at 31, 39-40.
24. Id. at 37.
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shareholders for the criminal activity of the corporation 2 5 and the under-
mining of compliance with the criminal law, which will result from the
widespread perception that this law punishes innocent individuals, "who
did not participate in or knowingly condone the [corporate] misconduct
.... "26 She points out that criminal penalties, when imposed on corpora-
tions, "prevent the unjust enrichment of shareholders and other corporate
constituencies. Any sanctions imposed in excess of the criminal profits
obtained are spread among so many shareholders as to be negligible." 2 7
Moreover, innocent family members of individuals who are held to be
criminally liable may suffer to some degree, just like shareholders of
corporations upon whom criminal penalties are imposed; "the stigma of
criminal conviction does not 'flow through' to shareholders," 28 however.
C. Approach of the Government
1. CORPORATE CRIMINAL CHARGING POLICY
Despite the fact that corporations can, in theory, be held criminally
liable in a court of law, federal prosecutors make the ultimate decision
regarding whether a given company will be indicted and charged for its
unlawful activities.29
Before 1991, the policy of the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
regarding charges for most offenses primarily concerned individuals.3 0
In 1991, this policy was indirectly "supplemented with a new chapter [of
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines] titled 'Sentencing of Organizations'
('Organizational Guidelines'). These Organizational Guidelines [mainly]
served as a guide for federal judges sentencing entities[, but] also [they]
emphasized corporate cooperation as a condition for leniency in the sen-
tencing process."' Commentators have suggested that because the
Organizational Guidelines "strongly encouraged companies to self-
25. See id. at 35-37; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An
Unscandalized Inquiry Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MicH L. REv. 386, 386-87
(1981) ("At first glance, the problem of corporate punishment seems perversely insoluble:
moderate fines do not deter, while severe penalties flow through the corporate shell and fall on the
relatively blameless.").
26. O'Sullivan, supra note 22, at 32.
27. Id. at 35.
28. Id.
29. See U.S. AroRNEY's MANUAL § 9-27.110(B) cmt. (2002), available at http://www.
justice.gov/usao/eousalfoia-reading-room/usam/title9/27mcrn.htm ("Under the Federal criminal
justice system, the prosecutor has wide latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even
whether to prosecute for apparent violations of Federal criminal law.").
30. See generally id. § 9-27.100 (focusing on charging decisions involving individual
offenders, rather than corporations).
31. Lawrence D. Finder, Internal Investigations: Consequences of the Federal Deputation of
Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L. REv. 111, 114 (2003) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL ch. 8 (2002)); see also Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business
72010]
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report and timely cooperate with appropriate governmental authorities in
order to earn leniency, federal prosecutors became emboldened into ask-
ing for waivers of privilege and work-product underlying the findings of
internal investigations." 32 However, "[e]ven though disclosure of inter-
nal investigation findings became more commonplace after the advent of
the Organizational Guidelines, corporations were not generally coerced
into waiver except by the most aggressive prosecutors.""
The first version of a specific corporate charging policy was issued
in 1999 by then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder.3 ' Four years
later, then-Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson promulgated a
revised set of such guidelines." In light of the troubling nature of sev-
Organizations and the Impact of Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 593-94 (2004)
(providing an overview of the Organizational Guidelines).
32. Finder, supra note 31, at 114 (footnote omitted).
33. Id.
34. See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, to All
Component Heads & U.S. Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16,
1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html.
Although the so-called "Holder Memo" was intended to further a uniform application of the
principles of corporate prosecution, it contemplated waivers of work-product and attorney-client
privilege as a precondition for the government's declination to charge the corporation. See id.; see
also Daniel Richman, Decisions About Coercion: The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver
Problem, 57 DEPAUL L. REv. 295, 297 (2008) (noting that for purposes of the Holder Memo
waiver of attorney-client privilege and work-product protections were factors prosecutors should
consider in deciding whether to criminally charge a corporation).
35. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, to
Heads of Dep't Components & U.S. Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.
htm. The charging factors listed in the Thompson Memo include (1) "the nature and seriousness of
the offense"; (2) "the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation"; (3) "the corporation's
history of similar conduct"; (4) "the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing
and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the
waiver of corporate attorney-client and work product protection"; (5) "the existence and adequacy
of the corporation's compliance program"; (6) "the corporation's remedial actions"; (7) "collateral
consequences"; (8) "the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the
corporation's malfeasance"; and (9) "the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory
enforcement actions." Id.; see also Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-
Client Privilege: A Response to the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HoFSTRA L. REV.
897, 898 (2005) (stating, in reference to the Thompson Memo, that "the Department of Justice
("DOJ") has adopted guidelines that seem to make waiver of the attorney-client privilege and
work product protection a prerequisite for being deemed 'cooperative,' a significant designation
that carries with it the prospect for more favorable penal treatment"); Lisa Kern Griffin,
Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 311,
320-21 (2007) ("A small but significant change between the two Memo[s] affectied] the
mandatory nature of the considerations, the necessity of waiver, and the use of [deferred
prosecution agreements]. The Holder Memo did not instruct prosecutors to reason backward from
every crime committed in the corporate context to consider whether charges might be brought
against corporations. The Thompson Memo, however applie[d] to all federal prosecutions of
corporations.... As a result, 'prosecutors automatically invoke[d] the Thompson Memo[ ] criteria
at the outset of every investigation and immediately start[ed] "grading" a company on its
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eral charging factors contained in the Thompson Memo, particularly its
suggestion that a corporation would need to waive its attorney-client and
work-product privileges3 6 in order to demonstrate that it was complying
with the government's investigation, then-Deputy Attorney General Paul
J. McNulty" amended the Thompson Memo and its immediate succes-
sor, the McCallum Memo," in 2006.'9
performance in the government's investigation."' (citing Mary Jo White, Corporate Criminal
Liability: What Has Gone Wrong?, 37 INsT. ON SEC. REG. 815, 820 (2005))).
36. The classic test used to determine whether attorney-client privilege applies to certain
communications or documents considers whether
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person
to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his
subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3)
the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his
client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily
either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal
proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the
privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
Under Seal v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal), 415 F.3d 333, 338 n.3 (4th
Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982)); see also Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981) (holding that in the corporate context, whether
attorney-client privilege applies should be determined on a case-by-case basis and that this
privilege may apply to non-senior employees who do not have any control over the operation of
the corporation). The Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States also articulated the standard for
evaluating work-product privilege, indicating that "the court [must] protect against disclosure of
the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation." 449 U.S. at 400 (citation omitted).
37. Paul McNulty announced his resignation from the post of Deputy Attorney General in
May 2007. See Michele Norris & Ari Shapiro, Deputy U.S. Attorney General McNulty Resigns,
NPR, (May 14, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=10179855. President
George W. Bush then appointed Craig S. Morford, who had been serving as the interim U.S.
attorney in Nashville, Tennessee, to be the acting Deputy Attorney General. See Dan Eggen,
Morford Named to No. 2 Spot at Justice Dept., WASH. PosT, July 19, 2007, at A3. Nearly a year
later, on March 3, 2008, Mark R. Filip, a federal district-court judge from Chicago, Illinois,
formally replaced McNulty as deputy attorney general. Dan Eggen, Senate Confirms New No. 2
for Justice Dept., WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2008, at A4, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2008/03/03/AR2008030302033.html. David W. Ogden was confirmed by the
Senate as Filip's replacement on March 12, 2009. Senate Confirms Ogden as Deputy Attorney
General, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 12, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/
washington/2009-03-12-ogdenN.htm. Ogden left the post in February 2010, and the position has
been filled by Gary G. Grindler pending the confirmation of James M. Cole. See Jerry Markon &
Anne E. Kornblut, James Cole Nominated for No. 2 Job at Justice Department, WASH. POST, May
22, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/21/AR201005210338
8.html.
38. See Memorandum from Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep't of
Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components & U.S. Attorneys, Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client
and Work Product Protection (Oct. 21, 2005), available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.
com/documents/AttorneyClientWaiverMemo.pdf.
39. The Thompson and McNulty Memos were criticized by a number of commentators,
including both practitioners and judges. As Stanley S. Arkin and Howard J. Kaplan contended,
"[tihe government's growing emphasis on 'cooperation' in connection with criminal and
regulatory investigations of . . . 'corporate fraud' [erodes] individual rights and legitimate
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The McNulty Memo forged several revolutionary changes in the
area of corporate charging decisions. Although it left intact the Thomp-
son Memo's nine factors that prosecutors must consider in deciding
whether or not to impose criminal charges on a corporation, the
McNulty Memo nonetheless stated that "[pirosecutors may only request
waiver of attorney-client or work-product protections when there is a
legitimate need for the privileged information to fulfill their law enforce-
ment obligations.""0
employment expectations, and . . . fundamentally alter[s] the traditional relationships among a
corporation's various constituencies, including its employees, counsel, and board of directors."
Stanley S. Arkin & Howard J. Kaplan, Coerced Cooperation Policy Threatens Employee Rights,
N.Y. L.J., May 11, 2005, at 3. Arkin and Kaplan explained that, pursuant to the Thompson Memo,
the government would frequently demand "that companies under investigation waive their
attorney-client privilege. If a company refuse[d] to waive its privileges, the government then
presume[d] that the company [wals not cooperating with the investigation (a real threat, given the
dire consequences that could flow from such a determination)." Id. Moreover, "[tlhe government's
aggressive enforcement policies also encourage[d] companies to disadvantage accused or even
potential subjects of an investigation . . . in an effort to demonstrate cooperation with the
government." Id. at 8. As a result, companies would "no longer support [or indemnify] employees
who [were] accused of wrongdoing, regardless of what the facts may [have] ultimately show[n]."
Id.; cf Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1613, 1661
(2007) (proposing a more nuanced understanding of the disfavoring of indemnification, noting
that "[it is not unreasonable for an executive branch agency to take the position ... that firms
serious about encouraging legal compliance do not provide their employees with limitless assets to
fund their defenses in cases of clear criminal wrongdoing," and suggesting that "[w]hile there
might be substantial disagreement about what kind and degree of indemnification are socially
desirable, and about the most effective shape of legal rules, there is general agreement that
indemnification can affect deterrence and that its blanket use is likely to be problematic").
It was on this basis that Judge Lewis A. Kaplan of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York criticized the Thompson Memo. The issue before Judge Kaplan
was a lawsuit brought by former employees of KPMG, one of the world's largest accounting
firms, which argued that "KPMG ha[d] refused to advance defense costs to which the defendants
[were] entitled because the government pressured KPMG to cut them off' so that KPMG would
appear to be more fully cooperating with the government, "thus violat[ing] [the employees'] rights
and threatenin[ing] their right to a fair trial." United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 336
(S.D.N.Y. 2006), affd, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008). Judge Kaplan ultimately agreed with the
defendants, holding that the government's conduct with respect to the issue of indemnification,
which was based on the directives of the Thompson Memo, "violated the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to the Constitution." Id. at 382. Furthermore, Judge Kaplan reminded the
government that its "proper concern [was] not with obtaining convictions" but with the
administration of justice. Id. at 381.
40. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, to Heads of
Dep't Components & U.S. Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
8, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf. Whether prosecutors
have a legitimate need for a given corporation's privileged information depends upon
(1) the likelihood and degree to which the privileged information will benefit the
government's investigation; (2) whether the information sought can be obtained in a
timely and complete fashion by using alternative means that do not require waiver;
(3) the completeness of the voluntary disclosure already provided; and (4) the
collateral consequences to a corporation of a waiver.
Id. at 9.
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Even if such a legitimate need did exist, the McNulty Memo
instructed prosecutors to "first request purely factual information, which
may or may not be privileged, relating to the underlying misconduct
('Category I')." 4 If prosecutors determined that they would have to ask
a corporation to waive attorney-client or work-product protections to
obtain Category I information, however, they were obligated first to
receive "written authorization from the United States Attorney who must
provide a copy of the request to, and consult with, the Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Division before granting or denying the
request."4 2 Furthermore, if prosecutors required corporations to reveal
attorney-client communications or non-factual attorney work product
(Category II) in addition to purely factual information (Category I), they
would first need to "obtain written authorization from the Deputy Attor-
ney General."43
In addition to ensuring that prosecutors did not insist that corpora-
tions waive their attorney-client and work-product protections to demon-
strate cooperation, the McNulty Memo also altered the Thompson
Memo's presumption that the companies that indemnify their employees
or advance them legal fees are not complying with government investi-
gations. Indeed, the McNulty Memo expressly dictated that
"[p]rosecutors . . . should not take into account whether [an entity] is
advancing attorneys' fees to employees or agents under investigation
and indictment."44
The McNulty Memo, however, did not change the Thompson
Memo's position that prosecutors should enter into DPAs and NPAs "in
exchange for cooperation when a corporation's 'timely [compliance]
appears to be necessary to the public interest and other means of
obtaining the desired cooperation are unavailable or would not be effec-
tive.'"45 The Justice Department's focus on such agreements reflected
the fact that going to trial is an expensive proposition both for the gov-
ernment and for business entities. Furthermore, even an indictment, not
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 10.
44. Id. at 11.
45. Id at 7 (citation omitted). Such alternative agreements, "which are less punitive and entail
reduced collateral harm, give prosecutors far more flexibility to strike the proper balance between
punishing and deterring criminal conduct on the one hand and encouraging and rewarding
voluntary disclosures and cooperation on the other." Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur,
Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and
Practice, 43 AM. Cua. L. REV. 1095, 1104 (2006). In addition, the use of these agreements
results in quick resolutions of "business crimes" and in a rise "in the levels of genuine cooperation
and self-reporting from companies." Id. at 1138.
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to mention a conviction, can be deadly for a corporation.4 6
A memorandum47 issued by then-Deputy Attorney General Mark
R. Filip4 8 in 2008 is the latest "iteration of the Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations . . . ."49 The Filip Memo clarifies
two significant aspects of previous corporate charging policy. First, it
states that "prosecutors should not take into account whether a corpora-
tion is advancing or reimbursing attorneys' fees or providing counsel to
employees, officers or directors under indictment."so Prosecutors also
may not request that a "corporation refrain from taking such action.""
Second, the Filip Memo alters the procedure for requesting and assess-
ing privilege waivers ;52 it mandates that a corporation receive credit for
cooperation if it discloses the "relevant facts"53 concerning the miscon-
duct and not if it waives attorney-client or work-product privilege.5 4 To
this end, the Filip Memo prohibits prosecutors from requesting waivers
of "core" attorney-client communications or work product (which would
include the Category II information referred to by the McNulty Memo)
and bars prosecutors from granting credit for cooperation to corporations
that do waive privilege with respect to this information. Moreover, the
46. See Wray & Hur, supra note 45, at 1097 ("Because indictment often amounts to a virtual
death sentence for business entities, a corporate prosecution provides the government an
[opportunity for effective deterrence]."); see also Richard A. Epstein, Editorial, The Deferred
Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006, at A14 ("[Slimply filing an indictment triggers
huge collateral repercussions sufficient to drive the firm out of business, as teams of state and
federal regulators are now duty-bound to suspend the licenses and permits under which the
corporation does business. . . . A conviction carries at most a million-dollar fine, but simple
indictment . . . imposes multibillion-dollar losses.").
47. See Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, to Heads of
Dep't Components & U.S. Att'ys, Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business Organizations
(Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Filip Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/opaldocuments/
corp-charging-guidelines.pdf.
48. See supra note 37.
49. Brandon L. Garrett, Corporate Confessions, 30 CARDOzo L. REV. 917, 928 (2008).
50. Filip Memo, supra note 47, at 13.
51. Id.
52. Indeed, the Filip Memo, in arguably softening the government's stance on corporate
privilege waivers, is viewed to be responding to legislation introduced on December 7, 2006, by
Senator Arlen Specter and written in conjunction with the ABA, the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, the ACLU, the Association of Corporate Counsel, and the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce on December 7, 2006. See Robert J. Anello, Preserving the Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege: Here and Abroad, 27 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 291, 296 (2008). The
purpose of this legislation, which was primarily directed at the Thompson Memo, was to place on
each government agency "clear and practical limits designed to preserve the attorney-client
privilege." Id. (quoting Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, S. 30, 109th Cong.
§ 2(b) (2006)).
53. Filip Memo, supra note 47, at 10.
54. See id. at 8-9.
55. See id. at 9 ("[W]hile a corporation remains free to convey non-factual or 'core' attorney-
client communications or work product-if and only if the corporation voluntarily chooses to do
so-prosecutors should not ask for such waivers and are directed not to do so."); see also Rachel
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Filip Memo encourages counsel for corporations who believe that prose-
cutors are violating these prohibitions to "raise their concerns with
supervisors, including the appropriate United States Attorney or Assis-
tant Attorney General."56
Nevertheless, commentators have questioned whether the Filip
Memo "goes far enough."" For example, the desired "relevant facts"
may ultimately include attorney work product or attorney-client commu-
nications." "[Iln many instances, such as where different witnesses have
provided contradictory accounts, any discussion of the 'facts' will
involve disclosing what the various witnesses said-i.e., revealing attor-
ney-client communications. Thus, under the Filip Memo, . . . corpora-
tions [may] still need to waive privilege . . . to provide the facts and
receive cooperation credit."59 Additionally, the Filip Memo "may actu-
ally lessen the procedural protections that the McNulty Memo offered
over a prosecutor's ability to obtain 'Category I' information, '"60 as
under the Filip Memo "no approvals are required for a prosecutor to
seek factual material even where its provision may require a privilege
waiver."61
Moreover, the Filip Memo suggests that corporations can "conduct
internal investigations in a manner that will not confer attorney-client
E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative
Law, 61 STAN. L. REv. 869, 919 (2009) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (indicating that in
replacing the McNulty Memo with the Filip Memo, the DOJ "provided the powerful white collar
defense interests with still further concessions, explicitly emphasizing that '[e]ligibility for
cooperation credit is not predicated upon the waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product'
and that 'prosecutors should not ask for such waivers."').
56. Filip Memo, supra note 47, at 14.
57. Mark J. Stein & Joshua A. Levine, The Filip Memorandum: Does It Go Far Enough?,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 11, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cclPubArticleCCjsp?id=1202
424426861 ("The thrust of the Filip Memo is that DOJ simply wants the facts .... The obvious
problem is that the 'facts' uncovered in an internal investigation are actually an attorney's
distillation of numerous interviews and documents and therefore work product."); see also Filip
Memo, supra note 47, at 10 n.3. ("If the interviews [with corporate personnel in conjunction with
an internal investigation] are conducted by counsel for the corporation, certain notes and
memoranda generated from the interviews may be subject, at least in part, to the protections of
attorney-client privilege and/or attorney work-product. [Although notes or memoranda generated
by such interviews may be immune from production], [t]o earn [cooperation] credit, however, the
corporation does need to produce, and prosecutors may request, relevant factual information-
including relevant factual information acquired through those interviews . . . -as well as relevant
non-privileged evidence such as accounting and business records and emails between non-attorney
employees or agents.").
58. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REv. 949, 971
(2009).
59. Stein & Levine, supra note 57.
60. Id.; see also supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text .(describing Category I
information as it is referenced in the McNulty Memo).
61. Stein & Levine, supra note 57.
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privilege on the results of an investigation,"6 2 by, for example, using
non-attorney personnel to collect employee or other witness state-
ments.63 Such a proposition ignores the fact that lawyers are much more
effective than non-lawyers in undertaking internal investigations, deter-
mining whether any violations of law have taken place, and evaluating
potential remedial measures."
While the Filip Memo clarifies the government's stance with
respect to corporations' waiver of attorney-client and work-product pro-
tections and indemnification of employees, other aspects of this Memo
are less definitive. For example, despite the fact that the Filip Memo
states that prosecutors cannot take into consideration "a company's
retention or discipline of culpable employees as a factor affecting coop-
eration credit, it allows the government to continue to consider retention
or discipline as a factor affecting remediation."16  Because both coopera-
tion and remediation affect the corporate charging decision, the signifi-
cance of this prohibition is dubious.6 6 Further, although this Memo
prohibits the government from taking into account whether a corporation
entered into a joint-defense agreement,67 it nevertheless suggests that
corporations should avoid entering into such agreements if they would
prevent them from disclosing relevant facts to the government.68
General objections to the Filip Memo, which can also be directed to
the Memos that preceded it, include the fact that it controls the actions of
the DOJ, and not of the SEC or the other regulatory bodies, and the fact
that it is nonbinding, thereby providing only suggested guidelines for
prosecutors.69
62. Id.
63. See Filip Memo, supra note 47, at 10.
64. See Stein & Levine, supra note 57.
65. Id.; see Filip Memo, supra note 47, at 16-17 (stating that the three factors to be used by
prosecutors in evaluating a corporation's remedial efforts are employee discipline-"whether the
corporation appropriately disciplined wrongdoers, once those employees are identified by the
corporation as culpable for the misconduct"-restitution, and reform).
66. See Stein & Levine, supra note 57.
67. See Filip Memo, supra note 47, at 12 ("[T]he mere participation by a corporation in a
joint defense agreement does not render the corporation ineligible to receive cooperation credit,
and prosecutors may not request that a corporation refrain from entering into such agreements.").
68. See Stein & Levine, supra note 57 ("Accordingly, [under the Filip Memo,] companies
will either continue to be penalized for entering into joint defense agreements or attempt to
negotiate one-sided agreements that permit full disclosure by the company while providing little
protection to the individual employees who join the agreement.").
69. See id. To that end, although the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006 "died"
following the issuance of the Filip Memo, supra note 47, Senator Specter introduced a 2009
version of this legislation because the Filip Memo's guidelines "could be modified by the [DOJ]
and failed to carry the force of law." Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2009 Is
Introduced in the Senate (S.445), FEDERAL EvIDENCE REviEw (Feb. 23, 2009), http://federal
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2. CORPORATE CRIMINAL SENTENCING POLICY
If a federal prosecutor decides to indict and charge a corporation
for its allegedly criminal activities, and if the corporation is ultimately
convicted on the charges filed against it, the corporation's punishment or
sentence will be determined largely in accordance with corporate crimi-
nal sentencing policy-specifically the Organizational Guidelines.70
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Booker," the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines")
are considered to be advisory and not mandatory. Nevertheless, the
Guidelines, including the Organizational Guidelines, still influence indi-
vidual and corporate sentencing to a great extent.72
Corporate criminal sentencing originated with the Organizational
Guidelines, which were promulgated in 1991.1 Pursuant to the Organi-
zational Guidelines, corporations facing criminal investigations can
lower their level of culpability, thereby reducing their potential fines, "if
they maintain 'effective compliance and ethics programs' to prevent and
detect violations of law, cooperate fully in ongoing investigations, self-
report, and accept responsibility."7 4 A compliance and ethics program is
considered to be effective by the government only if the organization
"exercise[s] due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct" and
"otherwise promote[s] an organizational culture that encourages ethical
conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law."" Factors
included in the evaluation of the effectiveness of a compliance and eth-
ics program are "the organization's history of violations and the exis-
tence and sufficiency of its efforts to prevent, police, discover, report,
and help punish wrongdoing by its employees."
The Organizational Guidelines also stress the need for timely and
thorough cooperation as a prerequisite for the imposition of a more leni-
evidence.com/blog/2009/february/attorney-client-privilege-protection-act-2009-introduced-senate-
s-445.
70. See generally Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A
Decade of Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 IowA L. REV. 697 (2002) (providing a thorough
overview of the development and application of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines).
71. 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005).
72. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Year of Jubilee ... or Maybe Not: Some Preliminary
Observations About the Operation of the Federal Sentencing System After Booker, 43 Hous. L.
REv. 279, 319 (2006) ("If the Booker regime of advisory Guidelines is not displaced by
legislation, it seems reasonable to predict that the Guidelines will remain the predominant factor in
determining individual sentences for years to come.").
73. See Griffin, supra note 35, at 317 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8
(1991)).
74. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (2004)).
75. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a) (2004).
76. Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473,
487 (2006).
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ent sentence. Timely cooperation begins "essentially at the same time as
the organization is officially notified of a criminal investigation.""
Thorough cooperation constitutes "the disclosure of all pertinent infor-
mation known by the organization," such as that "sufficient for law
enforcement personnel to identify the nature and extent of the offense
and the individual(s) responsible for the criminal conduct."7 8
Under the Organizational Guidelines, a corporation that is being
sentenced would begin with five culpability points; this figure can be
increased by up to five points if the position of the offender in the organ-
ization is sufficiently high; by up to two points for a previous criminal,
civil, or administrative adjudication; and by up to three points if there
was obstruction of justice with respect to the investigation or prosecu-
tion of the offense.79 Additionally, a company that has more than fifty
employees and that does not have an effective compliance or ethics pro-
gram pursuant to the Organizational Guidelines must develop such a
program and is subject to probation and continuing court supervision
until it does so.s0
On January 21, 2010, the United States Sentencing Commission
issued proposed amendments to the Guidelines (including the Organiza-
tional Guidelines). 8' With respect to corporations, these amendments
pertain to effective compliance programs, conditions of probation, and
extra credit for compliance programs. 82 First, the proposed amendments
add new commentary regarding the actions that a corporation should
take after detecting criminal conduct. This commentary states that orga-
nizations should (1) "take reasonable steps to provide restitution and
otherwise remedy the harm resulting from the criminal conduct" and (2)
"assess the compliance and ethics program and make modifications nec-
77. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 cmt. n.12 (2004).
78. Id.
79. See Griffin, supra note 35, at 318 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 8C2.5(a)-(e) (2004)). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also imposes some related cooperation
obligations on attorneys. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat.
745, 784 (2002).
80. See Griffin, supra note 35, at 318 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§§ 8D1.1(a)(3), 8DI.4(c)(1) (2004)).
81. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing
Guidelines 2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/20l0guid/20100121 Reader_Friendly-
ProposedAmendments.pdf. "The Sentencing Commission is accepting written public comments
on the proposed amendments through March 22, 2010, and will hold a public hearing on the
proposed amendments in the future. Historically, most proposed amendments have been
implemented." U.S. Sentencing Commission Proposes Changes Regarding Sentencing of
Corporations, KIRKLAND ALERT (Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Chicago, Ill.), Feb. 2010, at I [hereinafter
Sentencing of Corporations].
82. See Sentencing of Corporations, supra note 8 1, at 1-3.
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essary to ensure the program is more effective."" Further explaining the
"assessment" requirement, the proposed commentary states that "[t]he
organization may take the additional step of retaining an independent
monitor to ensure adequate assessment and implementation of the modi-
fications."" Such a monitor would thus potentially have to be retained
prior to the initiation of the criminal investigation into the corporation's
conduct.
Moreover, the proposed amendments now indicate that document-
retention policies must be implemented as part of an effective compli-
ance program. Indeed, the proposed amendments require that "[b]oth
high-level personnel and substantial authority personnel . . . be aware of
the organization's document retention policies and conform any such
policy to meet the goals of an effective compliance program under the
guidelines and to reduce the risk of liability under the law.""
Second, the proposed amendments contemplate the addition of new
conditions of probation for organizations. Under the 1991 Organiza-
tional Guidelines, courts would impose probation if an organization had
more than fifty employees and did not have an effective compliance pro-
gram in place.8 6 Pursuant to a probation order, courts could require a
corporation to submit reports regarding its progress in implementing an
effective compliance program and appoint a special probation officer to
oversee the corporation's compliance." The revised 2004 Organiza-
tional Guidelines state that even if an organization does have a compli-
ance program in place, a court shall order a term of probation if "such
sentence is necessary to ensure that changes are made within the organi-
zation to reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct.""
Some of the new conditions of probation for an organization set out
in the proposed amendments include (1) enhanced reporting require-
ments to the court regarding compliance and the organization's financial
status; (2) appointment of an independent corporate monitor; and (3)
83. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 cmt. n.6 (Proposed Amendments to the
Sentencing Guidelines 2010).
84. Id.
85. Id. § 8B.21 cmt. n.3.
86. See Cristie L. Ford & David W. Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate
Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 686-87 (2009).
87. See id. at 687.
88. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL. § 8D1.1(a)(6) (2004). The organization may also
be required to develop an "effective compliance and ethics program." Id. § 8D1.4(c)(1). In
assessing "the efficacy of a compliance and ethics program submitted by the organization, the
court may employ appropriate experts who shall be afforded access to all material possessed by
the organization that is necessary for a comprehensive assessment of the proposed program." Id.
§ 8D 1.4 cmt. n. 1. If the organization repeatedly violates the terms of probation, the Organizational
Guidelines specifically allow the court to appoint a special master or trustee to ensure compliance
with the court orders. Id. § 8Fl.I cmt. n.l.
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submission to "a reasonable number of regular or unannounced exami-
nations of facilities subject to probation supervision."89 Although terms
of probation reflecting these "new" conditions are typically sought by
the government at sentencing or during plea negotiations, "[t]he inclu-
sion of these specific terms of probation in the [Organizational] Guide-
lines could make it more difficult for a corporate defendant to argue
against a sentence that includes a monitor or to resist potentially onerous
inspection and reporting conditions."90
Finally, the proposed amendments consider the alteration of the
current policy that the reduction in a corporation's fine for having an
effective compliance and ethics program is not available if "high-level
personnel" "participated in, condoned, or w[ere] willfully ignorant of the
offense."9' The proposed amendments request comments regarding
whether the Sentencing Commission should amend this policy to permit
an organization to receive the reduction for having
an effective compliance program even when high-level personnel are
involved in the offense if (A) the individual(s) with operational
responsibility for compliance in the organization have direct report-
ing authority to the board .. .; (B) the compliance program was suc-
cessful in detecting the offense prior to discovery or reasonable
likelihood of discovery outside of the organization; and (C) the
organization promptly reported the violation to the appropriate
authorities[.] 92
If the Sentencing Commission were to effectuate this change, corpora-
tions would have a strong incentive to "self-report criminal conduct of
high-level executives" and to alter its reporting structure to ensure that it
provides for direct reporting.
II. DEFERRED- AND NON-PROSECuTION AGREEMENTS
The use of deferred- and non-prosecution agreements has been on
the rise in the corporate context,94 likely due to some combination of (or
all of) the following factors: changes in corporate charging decisions
forged by the Thompson Memo, an "increased emphasis on curtailing
corporate fraud in the post-Enron world, a desire to avoid collateral con-
sequences of prosecution such as seen in the Arthur Andersen, LLP case,
89. Id. § 8DI.4(b) (Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines 2010).
90. Sentencing of Corporations, supra note 81, at 2-3.
91. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 8C2.5(f)(3)(A) (2004).
92. Id. § 8DI.4 issue for cmt. (Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines 2010).
93. Sentencing of Corporations, supra note 81, at 3.
94. See Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the
Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 Ky. L.J. 1, 4 (2007) ("Recently, prosecutors have been
routinely using deferred prosecution agreements in the corporate context.").
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a corporate need to contain possible civil litigation resulting from prose-
cution, or nothing more than an increased flexing of prosecutorial
power."" Below, the Article discusses the differences and similarities
between DPAs and NPAs, as well as their use, and examines courts' and
commentators' views on such agreements.
A. Deferred-Prosecution Agreements
Deferred-prosecution agreements typically require prosecutors to
file criminal charges against a corporation while agreeing that these
charges will be dismissed within approximately one or two years, unless
the company breaches any of the terms of the agreement. 6 The filing of
formal charges typically coincides with the suspension of the application
of the Speedy Trial Act97 and the tolling of the statute of limitations."
DPAs, like NPAs, impose a variety of conditions and requirements
on corporations." A majority of DPAs, as well as NPAs, call for the
corporation to cooperate "with the government in its investigation of
culpable individuals . . . [and] accept[ ] . . . responsibility by acknowl-
edging the acts of its employees . . . ."1oo Such agreements also require
the business entity to take on "prospective internal reforms including
effective compliance programs and independent monitors, retrospective
review of particular financial transactions, and punitive measures,
including penalties, restitution and surrender of ill-gotten financial
gains."'o' The monetary penalties imposed pursuant to DPAs (and
NPAs) vary greatly, ranging from no penalty at all to those numbering in
the hundreds or thousands of millions of dollars.102 Moreover, along
with providing for corporate fines and penalties, DPAs (and NPAs)
95. Id. at 5.
96. See Wray & Hur, supra note 45, at 1104.
97. See Griffin, supra note 35, at 322; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2006) (stating that the
speedy trial requirement does not pertain to periods of delay "during which prosecution is
deferred" pursuant to an agreement between the parties).
98. See Griffin, supra note 35, at 322.
99. See Erik Paulsen, Note, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate
Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1439-43 (2007) (listing the potential
conditions and requirements that DPAs and NPAs could impose on organizations).
100. Wray & Hur, supra note 45, at 1104.
101. Id.; see also Griffin, supra note 35, at 322 (citation omitted) ("Companies will often be
required to engage the services of a monitor or examiner during the diversion period to review and
report on compliance efforts.").
102. Commentators have argued that while the "DOJ has, on average, pursued substantial
cases involving relatively large costs," it does not appear "to rely on fines for deterrence, but
rather on civil remedies such as restitution, disgorgement, and civil compensation, with a small
proportion of payment as fines. In so doing, the agreements comport with the Guidelines'
emphasis on providing restitution to victims." Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution,
93 VA. L. Rav. 853, 900 (2007); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B1.1 (2004);
cf 18 U.S.C. § 3572(b) (2006) ("[T]he court shall impose a fine or other monetary penalty only to
2010] 19
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
"may require companies to disgorge any gains from the misconduct that
ha[ve] not and will not be paid as restitution or by way of other remedial
measures."'o Finally, most DPAs (and NPAs) contain provisions
"prohibiting the company f[rom] making any statement that contradicts
the facts as laid out in the agreement . . . and . . . giving DOJ sole
discretion to determine whether the agreement has been breached by the
company."'"
A number of corporations have signed DPAs with the government
within the last several years in lieu of facing criminal charges for their
allegedly unlawful conduct.105 For example, pursuant to its DPA, Com-
puter Associates International, Inc. ("Computer Associates"), a New
York-based software producer, admitted that it committed accounting
fraud and inflated earning reports, agreed to pay $225 million in restitu-
tion to its shareholders, waived attorney-client privilege, added indepen-
dent directors to its Board of Directors, consented to furthering
corporate governance reforms, and hired a compliance monitor in
exchange for the government's deferral of prosecution for eighteen
months.IO6 Computer Associates also undertook a number of organiza-
tional reforms and agreed that it would not "make any public statement
... contradicting its acceptance of responsibility or the allegations set
forth in the [deferred prosecution agreement].""o'
Other high-profile companies such as Bristol-Meyers Squibb'os and
the extent that such fine or penalty will not impair the ability of the defendant to make
restitution.").
In 2009, however, the government tended to impose much higher financial penalties on
corporations than had previously been seen. See 2009 Year-End Update on Corporate Deferred
Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements, GIBSON DuNN (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.
gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2009YearEndUpdateCorpDeferredProsecutionAYearEndUp.
aspx [hereinafter Year-End Update]. In 2008, the largest monetary penalty "was $75 million
against Milberg Weiss. In 2009, however, there were five DPAs or NPAs with penalties greater
than $75 million-UBS, $780 million; Credit Suisse, $268 million; Lloyds TSB, $175 million;
Party Gaming, $105 million; and WellCare, $80 million." Id. Indeed, "the $780 million penalty
assessed against UBS for tax fraud is almost three times more than the total penalties assessed in
all DPAs and NPAs during 2008." Id.
103. Wray & Hur, supra note 45, at 1105.
104. Year-End Update, supra note 102.
105. From 2000 to 2009, the DOJ entered into 131 DPAs and NPAs with corporate entities. Id.
The number of DPAs and NPAs was negligible until 2003 and did not enter the double-digits until
2004. Id. In 2009, the DOJ entered into eighteen DPAs and NPAs, only one fewer than in 2008,
but twenty-one fewer than in 2007. Id. *
106. See Wray & Hur, supra note 45, at 1140 (citing Deferred Prosecution Agreement 2-5,
12, 14, 19-23, United States v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., Cr. No. 04-837 (ILG) (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 22, 2004) [hereinafter Computer Associates DPA], available at http://fll.findlaw.com/
news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/calusca9O4defpagr.pdf.
107. Computer Associates DPA, supra note 106, 27.
108. See generally Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. (D.N.J. June 15, 2005) [hereinafter Bristol-Meyers Squibb DPA], available at http://www.
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PNC Bank' 09 have also signed DPAs to avoid being prosecuted by the
government." 0 Depending on the severity of the alleged wrongdoing,
some DPAs have imposed quite restrictive, and at times innovative,
demands upon corporations, particularly in comparison to the Computer
Associates Deferred Prosecution agreement. 11
For instance, in the DPA between WorldCom, Inc. and the State of
Oklahoma," 2 WorldCom agreed to "pay $750 million in restitution to
the Company's former shareholders""' and to appoint an "entirely new"
CEO, CFO, General Counsel, and Board of Directors." 4 Roger Wil-
liams Medical Center ("RWMC"), in its DPA with the United States
Attorney's Office for the District of Rhode Island, stipulated that it
would "provide $4,000,000 worth of free and uncompensated medical
care to the Rhode Island public over the next two years at a rate of
$2,000,000 per year. This annual free and uncompensated medical care
[would] be over and above that care which RWMC [was] required to
provide by law . . . ."'1I Several other corporations have agreed to
donate funds to specific causes or non-profit organizations pursuant to
their DPAs." 6 Finally, at least two corporations have consented to spon-
justice.gov/usao/nj/press/files/pdffiles/deferredpros.pdf (setting out the terms of the Bristol-
Meyers Squibb deferred-prosecution agreement with the government).
109. See generally Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. PNC ICLC Corp., No.
2:03-mj-00187-ARH-ALL (W.D. Pa. July 29, 2003), available at http://www.law.virginia.edul
pdf/faculty/garrett/pnciclc.pdf.
110. See Wray & Hur, supra note 45, at 1138-41 (describing the deferred-prosecution
agreements signed by a number of high-profile corporations).
111. It appears, however, that this practice may have come to an end after the DOJ released
guidelines barring the "practice of extraordinary restitution," which includes monetary donations
to uninjured third-parties. See Year-End Update, supra note 102.
112. See Barnaby J. Feder & Kurt Eichenwald, A State Pursues WorldCom; Effects Seen on
U.S. Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/28/business/a-state-
pursues-worldcom-effects-seen-on-us-case.html ("Oklahoma charged [WorldCom] and six of its
former executives, including Bernard J. Ebbers, WorldCom's longtime chief executive, with 15
felony violations of the state's securities laws. .. . Each of the 15 counts in Oklahoma's complaint
is tied to financial reports WorldCom made to the S.E.C., starting in fall 2000. The complaint said
that the misrepresentation of WorldCom's finances induced Oklahoma's pension funds to buy
WorldCom stocks and bonds.... WorldCom's subsequent collapse cost the funds $64 million.").
113. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1, In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec Litig., No. 02 CIV 3288
(DLC), 03 CIV 1785 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2004), available at http://www.corporate
crimereporter.com/documents/mciok_000.pdf.
114. Id.
115. Deferred Prosecution Agreement 1 12, United States v. Roger Williams Med. Ctr., No.
06-02-T (D.R.I. Feb. 2007) [hereinafter Roger Williams DPA], available at http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/files/roger-williams-deferredsentence-agreement.pdf.
116. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 8 app. A 2, United States v. Operations Mgmt.
Int'l, Inc. (D. Conn. Feb. 2006) [hereinafter Operations Management DPA], available at http://
www.justice.gov/usao/ct/Documents/OMI%20Agreement.doc (stipulating that the corporation
donate "$1 million to the Greater New Haven Water Pollution Control Authority ... to fund one
or more of specific facility and environmental improvement projects and to the Long Island Sound
Fund and/or -Study, if funds remain available"); see also Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D.
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soring professorships in subject areas relating to their allegedly wrongful
conduct. Bristol-Meyers Squibb agreed to endow the chair in ethics at
Seton Hall Law School"' and Operations Management International,
Inc. agreed to fund a chair in environmental studies at the United States
Coast Guard Academy."'
B. Non-Prosecution Agreements
Non-prosecution agreements, though usually encompassing many
of the attributes of deferred-prosecution agreements, do not involve the
formal filing of criminal charges by the prosecutor against the corpora-
tion.'1 9 Although NPAs "allow the company to avoid any potential col-
lateral consequences associated with the mere fact that the company has
been charged with a crime, . . . they still require public acceptance of
responsibility, restitution and surrender of ill-gotten gains, full coopera-
tion, and implementation of remedial measures."' 2 0 In addition, as is
true of DPAs, the government reserves the right to prosecute the busi-
ness entity if it fails to comply with any part of its NPA.12 1
Major corporations, such as Adelphia Communications Corpora-
tion, 12 2 the Bank of New York ("BNY"),12 3 and Merrill Lynch, 1 24 have
McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The Department of Justice's Corporate Charging Policies,
51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1, 20 (2006) (referencing the requirement that FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating
Company, which was accused of violating certain environmental-law provisions, donate over "$1
million to Habitat for Humanity to build energy efficient homes" and donate funds "to the
University of Toledo to be used to develop energy efficient technologies" pursuant to its DPA).
117. See Bristol-Meyers Squibb DPA, supra note 108, 1 20. The agreement provided that
Bristol-Meyers Squibb "shall endow a chair at Seton Hall University School of Law dedicated to
the teaching of business ethics and corporate governance," and that an individual employed in this
position shall conduct "one or more seminars per year on business ethics and corporate
governance at Seton Hall University School of Law that members of [Bristol-Meyers Squibbs's]
executive and management staff, along with representatives of the executives and management
staffs of other companies in the New Jersey area, may attend." Id.
118. See Operations Management DPA, supra note 116, at 8 app. A 1 1.
119. See Wray & Hur, supra note 45, at 1105; see also Year-End Update, supra note 102
("[T]he emerging difference between a DPA and an NPA is whether a criminal information is
filed in a federal court. With a corporate DPA, the information . .. [and] the DPA itself[ J] are filed
with and must be approved by a federal district court. . . . NPAs are typically between the
corporation and the government and nothing is filed or approved by a court.").
120. Wray & Hur, supra note 45, at 1105 (citation omitted).
121. See id.
122. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Government Receives
Over $530 Million for Victims in Adelphia Fraud/Forfeiture Action (Feb. 23, 2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/February07/adelphiaforfeiturepr.pdf) (providing the
terms of the government's NPA with Adelphia Communications Corporation).
123. See Non-Prosecution Agreement Between the Bank of New York and the U.S. Attorney's
Offices for the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, United States v. Bank of N.Y.
(E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2005) [hereinafter BNY NPA], available at http://www.secinfo.
com/d9cw.z74.c.htm.
124. See generally Letter from Leslie R. Caldwell, Dir., Enron Task Force, Dep't of Justice, to
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entered into NPAs with the government. 125 In its NPA, for example,
BNY accepted responsibility for the misconduct of its employees who
"(a) aided and abetted the fraudulent activities of RW Professional Leas-
ing Services Corp. ("PLS") by executing sham escrow agreements ... ;
and (b) willfully failed to . . . file a Suspicious Activity Report ("SAR")
. . . and failed to notify law enforcement authorities of suspicious activi-
ties relating to PLS and the escrow agreements .... "126
The measures that BNY was required to take pursuant to its NPA in
order to avoid being criminally charged by the government closely
resemble those typically included in DPAs.127 BNY had to disclose all
information relevant to the government's investigation of its conduct.128
Additionally, BNY agreed to "pay a total of twelve million dollars ...
into a fund established to make restitution to any banking institutions
that suffered losses in reliance on BNY Escrow Agreements," 129 forfeit
its rights to $26 million in illegal profits, 130 undertake a number of reme-
dial measures with respect to its procedures of reporting suspicious
banking activities, and retain an independent examiner who would
ensure BNY's compliance with the agreement for a period of three
years. 131
Similarly, Merrill Lynch, in its NPA with the DOJ, agreed to truth-
fully disclose any information it had with respect to the potentially crim-
inal actions of its employees,13 2 to accept responsibility for these
actions,' 3 3 and to adopt and implement new "procedures relating to the
integrity of client and counterpartyl 34 financial statements and year-end
Robert S. Morvillo, Esq., Morvillo, Abramowitz, Grand, lason & Silberberg, and Charles
Stillman, Esq., Stillman & Friedman (Sept. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Merrill Lynch NPA], available
at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecollar/DPAs-andNPAs/$FILE/MerrillLynch
Agreement.pdf.pdf (setting out the terms of the Merrill Lynch non-prosecution agreement).
125. See Wray & Hur, supra note 45, at 1142-43 (surveying several corporations' non-
prosecution agreements with the government).
126. BNY NPA, supra note 123, 1.
127. It is likely that BNY's high level of cooperation with the government's investigation and
its willingness to acknowledge wrongdoing, combined with the fact that a seemingly isolated
subset of employees was engaged in the unlawful conduct, led to this agreement being an NPA, as
opposed to a DPA.
128. See BNY NPA, supra note 123, 7.
129. Id. 8.
130. Id. 9.
131. Id. V 10-12.
132. See Merrill Lynch NPA supra note 124, I n.1, 4 (specifically singling out "a) Merrill's
temporary 'purchase' from Enron of Nigerian Power barges .. . and subsequent sale of the barges;
and b) offsetting energy trades involving back-to-back options").
133. See id. 1 2.
134. According to the Merrill Lynch NPA, this term refers to "any U.S. corporation that is
registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, any domestic or foreign affiliate of such
corporation, any entity directly or indirectly controlled by such corporation, and any special entity
set up by such corporation." Id. exhibit A at 5.
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Although corporations such as BNY sign NPAs specifically to stay
in business and to avoid a nearly certain demise,13 6 some NPAs have
effectively put corporations out of business. For example, the demand-
ing requirements of its NPA caused the Dallas-based law firm of
Jenkens & Gilchrist to close all of its offices and to terminate its practice
in the field of law.13 1 Such occurrences, however, are generally limited
to relatively small corporations, which have committed an extensive
number of high-cost violations; otherwise, corporations' attraction to
DPAs and NPAs would not be so strong.13 8
C. Courts' Views of the Government's Use of Deferred- and
Non-Prosecution Agreements
Although the U.S. Code suggests that DPAs and NPAs should be
filed with and approved by a court,'3 9 many such agreements are not
135. Id. 8.
136. See Edward Iwata, Debate Heats Up on Justice's Deferred Prosecution Deals, USA
TODAY, May 31, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/regulation/2006-05-30-
justice-usatx.htm ("Even if a company doesn't go under or face an indictment, the threat of
prosecution can hobble a business . . . . A potential trial drains money and resources. Morale
among employees suffers, and many look for new jobs. The business must deal with the stigma of
criminal charges and face the full legal firepower of the government. That's why nearly all
businesses facing potential charges yield to prosecutors."); see also Michael R. Sklaire & Joshua
G. Berman, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: What Is the Cost of Staying in Business?, LEGAL
OPINION LETTER (Wash. Legal Found., Wash. D.C.), June 3, 2005, at 1, available at http://www.
wlf.org/upload/060305LOLSklaire.pdf ("In the post-Andersen era, the advantages of deferred
prosecution to a corporation that wishes to stay in business are obvious. Many companies will
enter into what may seem an onerous deal in order to avoid the stigma of a highly publicized
indictment and the penalties that may follow a felony conviction, and to use the agreement as a
mechanism to sell reforms to the board of directors.").
137. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., U.S. Enters Non-
Prosecution Agreement with Jenkens & Gilchrist in Connection with its Fraudulent Tax Shelter
Activity 1-2 (Mar. 29, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/March07/
jenkins&gilchristnppr.pdf ("[Jenkens & Gilchrist] was once a thriving firm with over 600
attorneys and offices across the nation. Approximately two-thirds of those attorneys left, and its
revenues declined sharply, as Government scrutiny of the firm's tax shelter practices intensified
.... The firm has advised the Office that ... it will be closing the last of its offices-its flagship
office in Dallas-at the end of the month, and that J&G will no longer engage in the practice of
law.").
138. Indeed, the number of NPAs has been rising steadily over the past several years. In 2009,
fifty percent of the prosecution agreements entered into by corporations and the DOJ were NPAs,
as compared to thirty-two percent in 2008. See Year-End Update, supra note 102. This increase
could be attributed to the more desirable nature of NPAs or could reflect the fact that "more
companies are self-reporting suspected violations, . . . [as it appears] that DOJ is more likely to
grant an NPA to a company that self discloses." Id.
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2006) (stating that the time to file an indictment is tolled
during "[a]ny period of delay during which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the
Government pursuant to written agreement with the defendant, with the approval of the court, for
the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct") (emphasis added). But
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submitted to courts at all.14 0 Moreover, despite frequent criticism by
scholars regarding the use of these agreements,141 courts have been
nearly unanimous in their acceptance of DPAs and NPAs.14 2
At least one federal district-court judge has held, however, that the
DPA between the government and KPMG LLP, a major accounting
firm, violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of certain employ-
ees, whom KPMG refused to indemnify pursuant to the Thompson
Memo's directives in the hopes of demonstrating its compliance with the
government's investigation.143 Such a litigation outcome'" is not likely
to occur frequently, however, in light of the DOJ's recent alterations of
corporate charging policy. For example, the McNulty Memo eliminated
the troubling aspects of the charging policy advanced by the Thompson
Memo, particularly negating the Thompson Memo's stance that corpora-
tions that do not waive attorney-client and work-product privileges and
that indemnify their employees are not cooperating with the
government."5
see Garrett, supra note 102, at 922 (noting that there is no case law or commentary interpreting
this provision).
140. See F. Joseph Warin & Andrew S. Boutros, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: A View
from the Trenches and a Proposal for Reform, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 121, 122 n.4 (2007).
141. See John C. Coffee Jr., Deferred Prosecution: Has It Gone Too Far?, NAT'L L.J., July 25,
2005, at 13 (arguing that concessions made by corporations in signing DPAs and NPAs and the
invasive nature of federal "cooperation" required from corporations in accordance with these
agreements raises the question of whether the practice of pre-trial diversion has "gone too far");
Russell Mokhiber & Robert Weissman, Multiple Corporate Personality Disorder: The 10 Worst
Corporations of 2003, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR (Dec. 2003), http://www.multinationalmonitor.
org/mmn2003/03december/decO3corpl.html (contending that deferred-prosecution agreements
"were never intended for major corporate crimes" and suggesting that only "flesh and blood
human beings," and not corporations, should be held responsible for their "crimes and misdeeds").
142. See Garrett, supra note 102, at 922. ("Every judge approving a deferred prosecution
agreement has done so without any published rulings or modifications to the agreement.").
Further, "[c]ourts have not intervened at the approval stage during which the parties negotiate and
agree on the terms of a structural reform prosecution agreement. . . . None have suggested how
judges can review such charging decisions." Id.
143. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[S]o much of the
Thompson Memorandum and the activities of the USAO as threatened to take into account, in
deciding whether to indict KPMG, whether KPMG would advance attorneys' fees to present or
former employees in the event they were indicted for activities undertaken in the course of their
employment interfered with the rights of such employees to a fair trial and to the effective
assistance of counsel and therefore violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the
Constitution."); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text (describing Judge Kaplan's holding
that the DPA between KPMG and the government violated the defendant employees' rights and
his concerns with the Thompson Memo).
144. Meaning that a decision that the government's DPA or NPA with a particular entity will
be overturned by the court because it violates the rights of the corporation or of its employees.
145. Moreover, the McNulty Memo expressly provided safeguards to ensure that prosecutors
do not abuse their power and continue to require corporations to waive attorney-client and work-
product privileges and to abstain from indemnifying their employees. See supra notes 40-43 and
accompanying text (providing an overview of these safeguards). These measures have been
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In addition, recent decisions have suggested that some courts are
even willing to accept the government's implementation of the now-dis-
favored Thompson Memo. For example, in United States v. Rosen,14 6
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held
that the government's reliance on the Thompson Memo "to pressure
defendants' employer, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC), to terminate defendants from their jobs and to cease advanc-
ing defendants' attorneys' fees for their defense in this case"'4 7 did not
violate the defendants' "constitutional rights under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments by depriving them of both due process of law and the right
to counsel."148 This court did state that the result it reached was not "an
endorsement of the Thompson Memorandum policy directive with
respect to an organization's payment or advancement of attorney fees for
employees who are targets or subjects of criminal investigations. Indeed,
that policy is unquestionably obnoxious in general and is fraught with
the risk of constitutional harm in specific cases."149 It ultimately held,
however, that because it is a defendant's right to retain counsel of
choice, no relief was warranted, "as no prejudice to the defense resulted
from the government's interference with defendants' right to have
AIPAC pay their attorneys." 150
D. Commentators' Views of the Government's Use of Deferred- and
Non-Prosecution Agreements
Commentators generally express concern regarding the govern-
ment's use of DPAs and NPAs. One significant and frequently raised
issue is the bargaining imbalance between corporations and the govern-
ment. Many scholars argue that "prosecutors abuse their powerful bar-
gaining position" in forcing organizations to agree to "overly intrusive-
and in some cases arguably arbitrary-terms."151
Another concern relates to the implementation of compliance pro-
preserved, to some extent, in the subsequent iterations of corporate-charging policies issued by the
DOJ. See supra notes 47-69 and accompanying text (describing the corporate-charging policies
following in the wake of the McNulty Memo).
146. 487 F. Supp. 2d 721 (E.D. Va. 2007).
147. Id. at 722-23.
148. Id. at 723.
149. Id. at 737.
150. Id.
151. David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings: A New
Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 307, 310 (2008) (citing Joan McPhee,
Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Ray of Hope or Guilty Plea by Another Name?, CHAMPION,
Sept./Oct. 2006, at 12, 14); see also Garrett, supra note 102, at 918 (contemplating possible
abuses in the terms and the implementation of DPAs and NPAs); Paulsen, supra note 99, at 1436
("[T]he government holds all the cards in negotiations over [DPAs and NPAs]. As long as the
threat of prosecution lingers over a company, the corporation is compelled to agree to the
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grams that meet the demands of the government. Some contend that
these programs are too costly and require the use of "corporate monitors
without clearly defined powers as to who can take actions adverse to
shareholder interests."l 5 2 Further, DPAs and NPAs, specifically the
monetary fines imposed pursuant to these agreements, are imperfect
tools for effecting widespread cultural or institutional change within a
corporation'1 and for instilling a sense of responsibility and of the
importance of self-regulation.154
On the other side of the spectrum, some have argued that DPAs and
NPAs result in "crime without conviction" because the penalties they
impose on organizations are not severe enough.155 Generally, corpora-
tions signing DPAs and NPAs are able to survive and rebuild, which
would be virtually impossible if they were indicted by the government.
In this sense, corporations do not feel the full force of their wrongful
conduct.
It does appear that DPAs and NPAs are the DOJ's tools of choice
for imposing liability on corporations.' 56 To that end, several solutions
have been proposed in an effort to address concerns relating to the draft-
ing and implementation of DPAs and NPAs. While one generally disfa-
vored solution is completely changing the law of corporate criminal
liability,' commentators have also made proposals that can be divided
into two categories: (1) having "prosecutors voluntarily constrain their
own discretion" in organizational cases; and (2) having "judges narrow
federal organizational criminal law."'
Examples of the first category proposals include channeling deci-
sions related to DPAs and NPAs "through a formal approval process at
the DOJ in Washington, D.C." rather than allowing individual federal
prosecutor's terms, vesting nearly absolute power in the government's hands. Unable to risk a
potential indictment, the corporation is thus left at the mercy of the prosecutor.").
152. Hess & Ford, supra note 151, at 310 (citing Jennifer O'Hare, The Use of the Corporate
Monitor in SEC Enforcement Actions, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 89, 102-06 (2006)).
153. See id. at 311 (citing Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Lw
Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 769-74 (2005)).
154. See id.
155. See id. at 310 (citation omitted); see also Garrett, supra note 102, at 856 (noting that
critics of the DOJ strategy with respect to DPAs and NPAs "with a different perspective, such as
Ralph Nader, called failures to convict organizations a 'shocking' and 'systematic derogation' of
the DOJ's duty to seek justice" (quoting Letter from Ralph Nader & Robert Weissman to Alberto
Gonzales, Attorney Gen. (June 5, 2006), http://multinationalmonitor.org/editorsblog/index.php?/
archives/26-The-Boeing-DOJ-Debacle.html)).
156. See Finder & McConnell, supra note 116, at 3 ("Absent pervasive, endemic criminal
activity within the organization, both sides have learned that these agreements serve as a valuable
tool that prosecutors may use to avoid the collateral consequences that occurred in Andersen and
to focus instead on individual wrongdoers.").
157. See Paulsen, supra note 99, at 1436-37.
158. Garrett, supra note 102, at 931.
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prosecutors to make decisions regarding these agreements' 5 9 and requir-
ing the government to retain an independent monitor having direct obli-
gations to the government agency.' 6 o Second category proposals include
permitting judges to vitiate DPA or NPA "provisions that attempt to
contract around judicial review and encroach on prosecutorial discre-
tion,"1 6 1 "to act as fiduciaries for constituencies otherwise unrepresented
in the corporate deferral process and potentially vulnerable to negative
externalities,"l 62 to take the place of independent civil monitors in
supervising organizational compliance with the conditions of DPAs and
NPAs,16 3 or to provide pre-indictment hearings to afford organizations
due process if the DOJ takes advantage of a DPA or NPA provision
allowing it to "unilaterally assert a breach, terminate the agreement, and
then pursue a criminal prosecution of the [relevant] organization."164
III. CITIZENs UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
Citizens United has a lengthy and convoluted history. Originally,
the case was brought by Citizens United, a "grassroots advocacy organi-
zation,"1 65 against the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") in Decem-
ber 2007. The organization argued, in connection with its anticipated
159. See Paulsen, supra note 99, at 1437.
160. See Hess & Ford, supra note 151, at 312. This monitor's role would include auditing
"corporate efforts to implement or improve compliance programs and internal controls, as well as
. . . ensur[ing] their effectiveness through changes in an organization's software." Id. at 340
(citation omitted); see also Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate
Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1713, 1720-26 (2007).
161. Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred?: Judicial
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1863, 1900
(2005).
162. Id. at 1901. In this capacity, judges would protect "parties whose interests may be
unnecessarily compromised by the prosecutor's unilateral imposition of the deferral terms.
[Specifically, judges] would look out for the employees whose jobs or attorney-client confidences
are jeopardized and for the investors who bear much of the brunt of penalties and obligations
imposed on the corporation." Id.
163. See Garrett, supra note 102, at 926-27.
164. Id. at 928; cf United States v. Miller, 406 F.3d 323, 334 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted)
("[I]n the context of non-prosecution agreements the government is prevented by due process
considerations from unilaterally determining that a defendant is in breach and nullifying the
agreement."); United States v. Castaneda, 162 F.3d 832, 835-36 (5th Cir. 1998) (requiring a
showing of "material breach" prior to allowing the government to prosecute a defendant with
whom it had a deferred-prosecution agreement); United States v. Meyer, 157 F.3d 1067, 1076-77
(7th Cir. 1998) (recommending the use of pre-indictment hearings); United States v. Ataya, 864
F.2d 1324, 1330 n.9 (7th Cir. 1988) ("A pre-indictment hearing would help prevent precisely the
sort of overreaching by prosecutors . . . in the drafting of ambiguous plea agreements . . . .");
United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 1986) (concluding that the preferred
procedure, "absent exigent circumstances," is for the government to seek a hearing pre-indictment
to seek relief from an agreement).
165. Press Release, Citizens United, CU Files Suit over Limits for Issue Ads (Dec. 14, 2007),
http://www.citizensunited.org/PRESS.ASPX?ENTRYID=9966133.
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release via video on-demand of a "hard-hitting political documentary,
Hillary: The Movie ('Hillary'),"1 6 6 that the First Amendment protects
issue-oriented television advertisements, and as a result these advertise-
ments should not be subject to the disclosure requirements promulgated
by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA"), 1 67 other-
wise known as the McCain-Feingold campaign finance law. 1 68
Specifically, Citizen United's lawsuit implicated those sections of
the BCRA that prohibit the airing of television advertisements prior to
elections that mention the name of a federal candidate (otherwise known
as "electioneering communications").169 Citizens United contended that
the BCRA's requirements that groups put disclaimers on such adso and
file reports containing information about the ads, including their contrib-
utors,' 7 1 are unconstitutional as they apply to Hillary and its accompany-
ing advertisements. 172 Additionally, it claimed that the BCRA provision
prohibiting corporations and unions from funding electioneering com-
munications out of their general treasury funds unless the communica-
tions are made to its stockholders or members, to get out the vote, or to
solicit donations for a segregated corporate fund for political pur-
166. Id.
167. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002)
(codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (2006)).
168. Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L. REV.
727, 758 n.136 (2009).
169. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (2006) (defining "electioneering communication"). In
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 194 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010), the Supreme Court found the electioneering communications provision not to be
unconstitutionally vague and upheld it. In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 470
(2007), however, the Court retreated from McConnell and held that the BCRA's electioneering
communication ban could not be applied to any ad unless it was "susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate."
170. See 2 U.S.C. § 441d(d)(2) (2006). Section 441d(d)(2) specifies that in advertisements not
authorized by a candidate or her political committee, the statement " is responsible for the
content of this advertising" must be spoken and appear in text on-screen for at least four seconds
during the advertisements not authorized by a candidate or her political committee. Id. This
provision is also known as section 311. See Citizens United v. FEC (Citizens United III), 130 S.
Ct. 876, 913-14 (2010).
171. These reporting requirements mandate that any corporation spending more than $10,000
in a calendar year to produce or air electioneering communications must file a report with the FEC
which includes the names and addresses of anyone who contributed $1000 or more in aggregate to
the corporation for the purpose of furthering electioneering communications. See 2 U.S.C.
§§ 434(f)(1), (f)(2)(F) (2006); 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) (2009).
172. See Citizens United v. FEC (Citizens United 1), 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 277 (D.D.C.), prob.
juris. deferred by 552 U.S. 1240, appeal dismissed by 552 U.S. 1278 (2008).
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poses, violates the First Amendment as it applies to Hillary.04
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
declined to grant declaratory and injunctive relief to Citizens United,
holding, in a 2008 opinion, that Citizens United could not prevail "in the
face of McConnell's ruling that the disclosure and disclaimer provisions
are constitutional and that the restriction on corporate speech advocating
the defeat of a candidate does not violate the First Amendment . . . ."i7
Approximately six months later, the court granted summary judgment to
the FEC,'7 6 concluding that the BCRA's disclosure and disclaimer
requirements and prohibition of the video on-demand distribution of Hil-
lary were constitutional. 17
Citizens United appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to
a special provision of the BCRA. 17 The Court noted probable jurisdic-
tion. 79 The case was initially argued on March 24, 2009.s0 Subse-
quently, the Court asked the parties to file supplemental briefs
addressing whether the Court should overrule either or both McConnell
and Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,"" on which
McConnell relied and which upheld the constitutionality of 2 U.S.C.
§441b.18 2 The case was reargued on September 9, 2009.183
The Supreme Court, with Justice Anthony Kennedy writing for the
majority, held that "[t]he Government may regulate corporate political
speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not
suppress that speech altogether."'14 As a result, the Court expressly
overturned Austin's holding that "political speech may be banned based
173. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006), invalidated by Citizens United III, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010). This provision does not bar electioneering communications paid for out of a segregated
fund that receives donations only from stockholders, executives, and their families. See id.
§ 441b(b)(2)(A)-(C)(i), (b)(4)(A). Any electioneering communication that is not prohibited by
this provision is subject to the disclosure requirements of § 201 and the disclaimer requirements of
§ 311. See supra notes 171-72.
174. See Citizens United 1, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 277.
175. Id. at 282.
176. Citizens United v. FEC (Citizens United II), No. 07-2240, 2008 WL 2788753 (ARR,
RCL, RWR), at *1 (D.D.C.), prob. juris. noted, 129 S. Ct. 594 (2008), affd in part, rev'd in part,
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
177. See id. (relying on the holding in Citizens United 1).
178. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403(a)(3), 116
Stat. 81, 113-14 (allowing the Supreme Court to hear direct appeals in disputes arising under the
BCRA).
179. See Citizens United III, 130 S. Ct. at 888 (citation omitted).
180. See id.
181. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United III, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
182. See Citizens United III, 130 S. Ct. at 888.
183. See id.
184. Id. at 886.
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on the speaker's corporate identity.""
Before considering whether it should overrule Austin, thereby hold-
ing that § 441b violates the First Amendment, the Court focused on
whether it could resolve the case on narrower grounds by determining
that § 441b did not apply to Hillary.'8 6 Citizens United had advanced
four reasons in support of this argument. First, it contended that Hillary
was not an "electioneering communication" because not it was not "pub-
licly distributed," as "a single video-on-demand transmission is sent
only to a requesting cable converter box and each separate transmission,
in most instances, will be seen by just one household-not [by] 50,000
or more persons."' Second, Citizens United argued that § 441b was
inapplicable in this case because Hillary was not the "functional
equivalent of express advocacy," as would be required to constitute an
"electioneering communication" by the tests articulated in Wisconsin
Right to Life and McConnell.'88 Third, Citizens United stated "that
§ 441b should be invalidated as applied to movies shown through video-
on-demand" because "this delivery system has a lower risk of distorting
the political process than do television ads."189 Finally, Citizens United
asked the Court "to carve out an exception to § 441b's expenditure ban
for nonprofit corporate political speech funded overwhelmingly by
individuals."' 90
The Citizens United Court rejected all of these arguments, however,
concluding that it could not "resolve this case on a narrower ground
without chilling political speech, speech that is central to the meaning
and purpose of the First Amendment.""' Thus, the Court was compelled
to consider "the continuing effect of the speech suppression upheld in
Austin."' 92
In doing so, the Court first determined that § 441b is a ban on
speech. As it restricts the amount of money a person or group can spend
on political communication, the statute "necessarily reduces the quantity
of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of
185. Id.
186. See id. at 888.
187. Id. at 888-89.
188. Id. at 889. McConnell held that § 441b(b)(2)'s definition of an "electioneering
communication" was facially constitutional insofar as it restricted speech that was "the functional
equivalent of express advocacy" for or against a specific candidate. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S.
93, 206 (2003). According to Wisconsin Right to Life, the functional-equivalent test is objective:
"[A] court should find that [a communication] is the functional equivalent of express advocacy
only if [it] is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or
against a specific candidate." FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2007).
189. Citizens United III, 130 S. Ct. at 890.
190. Id. at 891.
191. Id. at 892.
192. Id.
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their exploration, and the size of the audience reached."'
Laws that burden political speech are strictly scrutinized, meaning
that the government must prove that the speech restriction "furthers a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest." 94
The First Amendment prohibits attempts to disfavor certain subjects or
viewpoints (content-based restrictions)" and restrictions distinguishing
among different speakers, allowing speech by some, but not by
others.' 96 Although it acknowledged that it had "upheld a narrow class
of speech restrictions that operate to the disadvantage of certain persons,
[the Court noted that] these rulings were based on an interest in allowing
governmental entities to perform their functions."' 97 As the "corporate
independent expenditures at issue in [Citizens United] . . . would not
interfere with governmental functions," the Court deemed these rulings
to be inapplicable. 19 8 Thus, the Court found "no basis for the proposition
that, in the context of political speech, the Government may impose
restrictions on certain disfavored speakers." 99
The Court then focused specifically on the First Amendment rights
of corporations, observing that corporations are protected by the First
Amendment 2" and that this protection has been "extended by explicit
holdings to the context of political speech."2 0 1
193. Id. at 898 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19
(1976) (per curiam)).
194. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007).
195. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813-14 (2000) (citations
omitted) ("If a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling Government interest. If a less restrictive alternative would serve the
Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative. . . . [E]ven where speech is
indecent and enters the home, the objective of shielding children does not suffice to support a
blanket ban if the protection can be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative.").
196. See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) ("We . . . find no
support . . . for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the
First Amendment loses that protection simply because its source is a corporation that cannot
prove, to the satisfaction of a court, a material effect on its business or property.").
197. Citizens United III, 130 S. Ct. at 899; see, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (protecting the "function of public school education"); Jones v. N.C
Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted) (furthering "the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system"); Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974) (citation omitted) (ensuring "the capacity of the Government to
discharge its [military] responsibilities"); U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 557 (1973) ("[F]ederal service should depend upon meritorious
performance rather than political service . . . .").
198. Citizens United III, 130 S. Ct. at 899.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 889-900.
201. Id. at 900; see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8
(1986) (plurality opinion) ("Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the
'discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas' that the First Amendment
seeks to foster." (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783)); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784 (holding that
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According to the Court, Austin was the first decision out of a long
line of cases202 that upheld "a direct restriction on the independent
expenditure of funds for political speech . ... " In Austin, the Michi-
gan Chamber of Commerce sought to use general treasury funds to place
an advertisement supporting a specific candidate for the Michigan
House of Representatives in a local newspaper.204 Michigan law, how-
ever, prohibited corporations from making contributions and indepen-
dent expenditures in connection with elections for state office. 205 A
violation of the law was punishable as a felony.2 06 The Court upheld this
law, distinguishing Buckley v. Valeo and First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti by finding a compelling governmental interest in preventing
"the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's politi-
cal ideas."207
In Citizens United, the government acknowledged the so-called
antidistortion rationale used in Austin but primarily argued that two
other compelling interests supported Austin's holding that corporate-
expenditure restrictions are constitutional: "an anticorruption interest
and a shareholder-protection interest." 208 The Court considered the three
arguments in turn. First, it determined that Austin's antidistortion inter-
est could not support § 441b because it was inconsistent with the First
Amendment protection extended to corporate political speech by Buck-
ley and Bellotti209 and because its application would "produce the dan-
gerous, and unacceptable, consequence that Congress could ban political
speech of media corporations" 2 '0 and disadvantage smaller and non-
political speech does not lose First Amendment protection "simply because its source is a
corporation").
202. See Citizens United III, 130 S. Ct. at 903; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19
(1976) (per curiam)) ("A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
audience reached.").
203. Citizens United III, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce,




207. Id. (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660); see also Nathaniel Persily, Contested Concepts in
Campaign Finance, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 118, 120 (2003) ("[Tlhe [Austin] Court has recognized
a special corruption danger arising when corporate directors, unlike an individual or leader of a
political association, contribute money from people (namely, shareholders) who do not support the
candidate receiving the contribution.").
208. Citizens United III, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (citations omitted).
209. See id. at 904.
210. Id. at 905.
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profit corporations rather than punishing "amassed wealth." 2 1 1
Second, the Court concluded that an anticorruption interest could
not support § 441b. It pointed out that although the Buckley Court
deemed this interest "sufficiently important" to allow limits on contribu-
tions, it did not extend that reasoning to expenditure limits.2 12 Further,
when Buckley examined an expenditure ban, it found "that the govern-
mental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corrup-
tion [was] inadequate to justify [the ban] on independent
expenditures."213 The Citizens United Court emphasized that the
"appearance of influence or access . . . will not cause the electorate to
lose faith in our democracy. By definition, an independent expenditure is
political speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a
candidate."214 It also cautioned that although it had to "give weight to
attempts by Congress to seek to dispel either the appearance or the real-
ity" of electoral official corruption, Congress's remedies must still com-
ply with the First Amendment: "An outright ban on corporate political
speech during the critical preelection period is not a permissible
remedy." 2 15
Third, the Citizens United Court rejected the applicability of the
shareholder-protection interest, as this interest would allow the govern-
ment to ban the political speech of media corporations-an impermissi-
ble result in the Court's opinion.2 16 The Court further found that most
abuse could be corrected by shareholders through the use of "procedures
of corporate democracy."217 Moreover, the Court noted that § 441b is
211. Id. at 907. The result of upholding § 441b "is that smaller or nonprofit corporations
cannot raise a voice to object when other corporations, including those with vast wealth, are
cooperating with the Government." Id. Thus, "[e]ven if § 441b's expenditure ban were
constitutional, wealthy corporations could still lobby elected officials, although smaller
corporations may not have the resources to do so." Id. at 908. Furthermore, "wealthy individuals
and unincorporated associations can spend unlimited amounts on independent expenditures. Yet
certain disfavored associations of citizens-those that have taken on the corporate form-are
penalized for engaging in the same political speech." Id. (citations omitted).
212. Id. at 908 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam)).
213. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45) (internal quotation marks
omitted). "When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption."
Id. at 909; see also FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm'n., 470 U.S. 480, 497
(1985) ("The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.");
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 ("To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political
quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of
representative democracy is undermined.").
214. Citizens United III, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (citation omitted).
215. Id. at 911.
216. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
217. Citizens United III, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting First
Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
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"both underinclusive and overinclusive" 218 with respect to protecting
shareholder interests. The statute is underinclusive because "[a] dissent-
ing shareholder's interests would be implicated by speech in any media
at any time," not merely by speech in certain media made "within 30 or
60 days before an election." 2 19 It is overinclusive because it pertains to
all types of corporations, even those that have single shareholders or no
shareholders at all.220
After concluding that § 441b violated the First Amendment, the
Citizens United Court held that it was compelled to overturn Austin, as
no sufficiently compelling governmental interest justified suppression of
political speech on the basis of the speaker's (nonprofit or for-profit)
corporate identity. 221 The Court noted that Austin was not well reasoned
because that opinion "abandoned First Amendment principles . . . by
relying on language in some of our precedents that traces back to the
Automobile Workers Court's flawed historical account of campaign
finance laws."2 22 In the opinion of the Citizens United Court, Austin's
holding had also been "undermined by experience since its announce-
ment," as speakers have found countless ways to get around campaign-
finance laws. 223 Technological changes, such as the internet, blogs, and
social networks, may now also permit citizens to obtain significant
information about political candidates and issues; banning such speech
would be problematic under the First Amendment.224 Finally, no serious
reliance interests were at stake, counseling against adherence to the prin-
ciple of stare decisis in this case. 2 25 Given the overturning of Austin, the
Court held that § 441b's restrictions on corporate independent expendi-
tures were invalid and could not be applied to Hillary.22 6
In concluding the opinion, the Court resolved the question of
218. Id. at 911.
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 913. The Court also overruled "the part of McConnell that upheld BCRA
§ 203's extension of § 441b's restrictions on corporate independent expenditures" because the
"McConnell Court relied on the antidistortion interest recognized in Austin to uphold a greater
restriction on speech than the restriction upheld in Austin .... " Id.
222. Id. at 912.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 912-13 ("Internet sources, such as blogs and social networking Web sites [may
soon] provide citizens with . . . information about political candidates and issues. Yet, § 441b
would seem to ban a blog post expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate if that
blog were created with corporate funds.").
225. See id. The Court reasoned that "reliance interests are important considerations in
property and contract cases, where parties may have acted in conformance with existing legal
rules in order to conduct transactions. Here, though, parties have been prevented from acting-
corporations have been banned from making independent expenditures." Id. (citing Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)).
226. See id. at 913.
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whether BCRA's disclaimer and disclosure provisions were constitu-
tional as they were applied to Hillary and the three accompanying adver-
tisements.2 27 The Court stated that these requirements 228 are subjected to
"'exacting scrutiny,' which requires a 'substantial relation' between the
disclosure requirement and a 'sufficiently important' governmental
interest." 229 A governmental interest in "provid[ing] the electorate with
information" about the sources of election-related spending is suffi-
ciently important. 2 3 0 Because Hillary and the ads for Hillary "referred to
then-Senator Clinton by name shortly before a primary and contained
pejorative references to her candidacy," the Court held that the required
disclaimers and disclosures were constitutional, as they did not chill
speech or expression, and they provided the electorate with information
about the person or group sponsoring Hillary.2 3 1
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito concurred in the Court's
majority opinion, writing separately to address the principles of judicial
restraint and stare decisis implicated by Citizens United.2 32 Justices
Scalia, Alito, and Thomas (in part) joined the opinion of the Court and
wrote separately to answer a concern regarding the original understand-
ing of the First Amendment that was raised by the dissent.233
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor, disagreed with the majority in several respects. Before
attacking the decision on the merits, Stevens stated that the question of
§ 441b's constitutionality was not properly presented to the Court, and
as a result the Court should not have addressed this issue. 234 He also
argued that the case could have been resolved on narrower grounds; the
Court could have held, for example, that § 441b did not apply to Hillary
because it did not constitute an "electioneering communication" (due to
the fact that it was a feature-length film distributed through video-on-
demand).235 Moreover, Stevens contended that the Court's decision to
227. See id. at 913-16.
228. See supra notes 170-71 (describing these requirements in detail).
229. Citizens United III, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64, 66
(1976)).
230. Id. (alteration in original).
231. See id. at 915. The disclaimer and disclosure requirements would be unconstitutional as
applied to an organization if there were a "reasonable probability that its members would face
threats, harassment, or reprisals if their names were disclosed." Id. at 916 (citing McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 198 (2003).
232. See id. at 917 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
233. See id. at 925 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurrence in
which he disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the disclaimer and disclosure requirements
were constitutional as applied to Hillary and the advertisements for Hillary. See id. at 982
(Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
234. See id. at 931 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
235. See id. at 937.
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overturn Austin and parts of McConnell was not in accord with the prin-
ciples of stare decisis, as "[t]he only relevant thing that has changed
since Austin and McConnell is the composition of th[e] Court."2 36
Turning to the merits of the Citizens United majority opinion, Jus-
tice Stevens stated that the three claims upon which the opinion rested
were wrong. 237 First, he contended that "neither Austin nor McConnell
held or implied that corporations may be silenced," thereby "banning"
corporate political speech.238 Instead, § 441b targeted a "class of com-
munications that is especially likely to corrupt the political process, that
is at least one degree removed from the views of individual citizens, and
that may not even reflect the views of those who pay for it." 239 Second,
Stevens argued that the holding in Bellotti was far narrower than the
majority implied and that there was no justification for the majority's
conclusion that the government cannot restrict political speech based on
the speaker's identity. 2 4 0 Third, Stevens posited that it was the major-
ity's opinion, and not Austin and McConnell, that constituted a "radical
departure from what has been settled First Amendment law."241
In support of his third argument, Justice Stevens suggested that the
Framers did not have corporations in mind when they enshrined the right
to free speech in the First Amendment, as business corporations were
not seen as having the ability to exercise their speech rights "given that
'at the time, the legitimacy of every corporate activity was thought to
rest entirely in a concession of the sovereign.'" 24 2 He also pointed out
that the Court's holding and reasoning in Austin had been repeatedly
affirmed in the twenty years that had passed since this decision was
handed down.24 3 In this regard, Stevens argued that the majority improp-
erly relied on Buckley and Bellotti because both of these cases focused
on statutory provisions that differed from those involved in Citizens
United.2 " Finally, Stevens examined the interests at stake in Citizens
United, contending that the governmental interest in preventing corrup-
236. Id. at 942.
237. See id. These claims were that (1) "Austin and McConnell have 'banned' corporate
speech"; (2) "the First Amendment precludes regulatory distinctions based on speaker identity,
including the speaker's identity as a corporation"; and (3) "Austin and McConnell were radical
outliers in our First Amendment tradition and our campaign finance jurisprudence." Id.
238. Id. at 944-45.
239. Id. at 945.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 948.
242. Id. at 950 (quoting David Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate Speech, 18
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541, 578 (1991)); cf Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
243. See Citizens United III, 130 S. Ct. at 956 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
244. See id at 957.
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tion or the appearance of corruption was not limited to quid pro quo
corruption.2 4 5
Justice Stevens also separately emphasized the correctness of Aus-
tin based on the fact that the statute implicated in that case (as well as
the provisions involved in Citizens United), imposed "only a limited
burden on First Amendment freedoms not only because they target a
narrow subset of expenditures and leave untouched the broader 'public
dialogue,' but also because they leave untouched the speech of natural
persons."24 6 In doing so, Stevens emphasized the differences between
corporations and human beings:
Unlike natural persons, corporations have "limited liability" for their
owners and managers, "perpetual life," separation of ownership and
control, "and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribu-
tion of assets . . . that enhance their ability to attract capital and to
deploy their resources in ways that maximize the return on their
shareholders' investments.24
It might also be added that corporations have no consciences, no
beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. Corporations help struc-
ture and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and their
245. See id. at 961. In support of this point, Stevens reasoned that
[c]orruption can take many forms. Bribery may be the paradigm case. But the
difference between selling a vote and selling access is a matter of degree, not kind.
And selling access is not qualitatively different from giving special preference to
those who spent money on one's behalf. Corruption operates along a spectrum, and
the majority's apparent belief that quid pro quo arrangements can be neatly
demarcated from other improper influences does not accord with the theory or
reality of politics. It certainly does not accord with the record Congress developed in
passing BCRA, a record that stands as a remarkable testament to the energy and
ingenuity with which corporations, unions, lobbyists, and politicians may go about
scratching each other's backs-and which amply supported Congress'
determination to target a limited set of especially destructive practices.
Id. Stevens argued that Buckley's language and the BCRA record supported this reasoning. See id.
at 964-65; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (per curiam) ("Of almost equal
concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of
corruption . . . ."); McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 622-23 (D.D.C.) (per curiam)
(Kollar-Kottely, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("The record powerfully demonstrates
that electioneering communications paid for with the general treasury funds of labor unions and
corporations endears those entities to elected officials in a way that could be perceived by the
public as corrupting."), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens
United III, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
Further, later in his dissent, Stevens also argued in support of the shareholder-protection
interest as it was articulated in Austin, stating that this interest "bolsters the conclusion that
restrictions on corporate electioneering can serve both speakers' and listeners' interests, as well as
the anticorruption interest. And it supplies yet another reason why corporate expenditures merit
less protection than individual expenditures." Citizens United III, 130 S. Ct. at 979 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
246. Id. (citation omitted).
247. Id. at 971 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59
(1990)).
38 [Vol. 65:1
THE HUMANIZATION OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY
"personhood" often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not
themselves members of "We the People" by whom and for whom our
Constitution was established.248
Moreover, Stevens noted that the ways in which corporations are struc-
tured permit them to dominate the electioneering realm, potentially chil-
ling non-corporate participation in democratic governance due to the
perception that those with the most money control election and policy
outcomes.2 49
IV. CITIZENS UNITED AND CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The implicit suggestion of the Citizens United majority that corpo-
rations have the same rights as natural persons, at least under the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause 2 5 0-particularly when contrasted
with Justice Stevens's vigorous dissent, which raised concerns regarding
this view-suggests that the manner in which corporate criminal liabil-
ity is currently addressed is at the very least problematic, if not
unconstitutional.
Prosecutors overwhelmingly use deferred- and non-prosecution
agreements in remedying corporate misconduct. 25 1 DPAs and NPAs
impose relatively standard conditions on corporations.2 5 2 As described
above, the following are the most typical conditions included in DPAs
and NPAs: (1) cooperation with the government; (2) acceptance of
responsibility; (3) undertaking of internal reforms, including the imple-
mentation of prospective effective compliance programs and the use of
independent monitors; (4) retrospective review of particular financial
transactions, and punitive measures, including penalties, restitution and
surrender of ill-gotten financial gains; (5) agreement to refrain from
making any statement that contradicts the facts as laid out in the relevant
agreement; and (6) allowing that the government has the sole discretion
to determine whether the corporation has breached the agreement in
question. Many of these conditions could not be imposed on a natural
person who is facing criminal indictment.
For example, if an individual agreed to the first typical provision
mandating cooperation with the government, she would be waiving her
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and her Sixth Amend-
248. Id. at 972.
249. See id. at 974.
250. See id. at 900 (majority opinion) ("The Court has thus rejected the argument that political
speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First
Amendment simply because such associations are not 'natural persons."' (citing First Nat'l Bank
of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978))).
251. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 99-104, 119-21 and accompanying text.
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ment right to trial by jury.253 A corporation, however, does not have the
right to remain silent because it is not a "natural person."254 Addition-
ally, the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether corporations have
the jury trial right.25 5 If Justice Stevens's view that the Citizens United
majority equates corporations and natural persons is taken to its inevita-
ble conclusion, the Court may have to rethink its position (or lack
thereof) regarding the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of corpora-
tions. As a result, conditions forcing corporations to waive these rights
may no longer be included in DPAs and NPAs.
Similarly, the second typical requirement included in DPAs and
NPAs, acceptance of responsibility, could implicate Fifth Amendment
concerns. In accepting responsibility, an organization provides the gov-
ernment with "detailed admissions . . . of [its] wrongdoing," 25 6 effec-
tively offering up a confession. Under current Supreme Court case law,
"corporate persons, which lack any state of mind, lack Fifth Amendment
privilege."2 57 Thus, the acceptance-of-responsibility condition is cur-
rently constitutional, although it may not be in the future if the Supreme
Court explicitly adopts the view advanced by Citizens United that corpo-
rations are comparable to natural persons with respect to the constitu-
tional rights they possess.
Finally, the sixth typical condition included in DPAs and NPAs,
that the government has the sole discretion to determine whether the
corporation has breached the agreement in question, could invoke due-
process issues. Pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, fed-
253. See Andrew Gilman, Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act: The Prospect of
Congressional Intervention into the Department of Justice's Corporate Charging Policy, 35
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1075, 1077 (2009).
254. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988) ("There also is no question that the
foreign banks cannot invoke the Fifth Amendment in declining to produce the documents; the
privilege does not extend to such artificial entities."); see also Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S.
99, 102 (1988) (citation omitted) ("[I]t is well established that such artificial entities are not
protected by the Fifth Amendment."); Comcast of L.A., Inc. v. Top End Int'l, Inc., No.
CVO32213JFWRCX, 2003 WL 22251149, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2003) (citations omitted)
("Tihe privilege against self-incrimination only protects natural persons, not artificial entities such
as corporations.").
255. See F. Joseph Warin & Michael D. Bopp, Corporations, Criminal Contempt and the
Constitution: Do Corporations Have a Sixth Amendment Right to Trial by Jury in Criminal
Contempt Actions and, if so, Under What Circumstances?, I COLum. Bus. L. REV. 1, 13 (1997)
(noting that three federal courts of appeals have held that corporations are protected by the Sixth
Amendment but that the Supreme Court has not directly resolved this issue); see also V.S.
Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1477,
1518 (1996) (concluding that "[tihe Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial may, arguably, be
available to corporate defendants"). But see Alan L. Adlestein, A Corporation's Right to a Jury
Trial Under the Sixth Amendment, 27 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 375, 449 (1994) (stating "that a
corporation does not have a right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment").
256. Garrett, supra note 49, at 926.
257. Id. at 918.
40 [Vol. 65:1
THE HUMANIZATION OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY
eral and state governments may not deprive any person "of life, liberty,
or property without due process of the law."258 Due process, in this con-
text, includes the opportunity for a meaningful hearing 259 in front of an
impartial decision maker.26 0
In fact, as was previously noted, several courts have held, in cases
involving NPAs signed by individuals (as opposed to corporations), that
unilateral determinations of breach made without the benefit of judicial
involvement contravene the principle of due process.261 Indeed, one
court has concluded that in the context of non-prosecution agreements
"[d]ue process prevents the government from unilaterally determining
that a defendant breached the . . . agreement."26 2
It is true that if DPAs and NPAs are analogized to plea-bargaining
agreements, the first two constitutional concerns mentioned above may
appear to be unfounded. After all, plea bargains induce individuals to
waive their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and yet plea bargaining
has been held to be constitutional263 and plea bargains are routinely
accepted by federal and state courts.2 6 To be accepted by a court, how-
ever, a plea bargain must satisfy certain requirements. For example,
administrative conveniences should not trump an individual's funda-
mental liberties.2 65 The plea bargain must also not be the product of
threat or coercion, and it must be entered into knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently.2 6 6
The Supreme Court has held, in effect, that assistance of counsel is
"a proxy for voluntariness in pleading, effectively establishing that a
258. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
259. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (holding that due process requires
a pre-termination evidentiary hearing before the discontinuation of welfare).
260. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973) (holding that it is a violation of
due process for a decision-maker to be able to gain personally from his or her decision).
261. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
262. United States v. Meyer, 157 F.3d 1067, 1076 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting United States v. Verusio, 803 F.2d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 1986)).
263. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (holding that it is not
"unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial
benefit to the state"). But cf Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58
STAN. L. REV. 989, 1033-34 (2006) (arguing that the rise of plea bargaining implicates separation
of powers concerns).
264. See Catherine Greene Burnett, Of Crime, Punishment, Community and an Accused's
Responsibility to Plead Guilty: A Response to Gerard Bradley, 40 S. TEx. L. REv. 281, 291
(1999) ("[P]lea bargaining has demonstrated itself to be a necessary component, without which
our criminal justice system would collapse of its own weight.").
265. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (quoting People v. Fisher, 164 N.E.
336, 341 (N.Y. 1928)).
266. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 747; see also Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers
Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist's Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2011, 2018 (2000) (describing the requirements of a constitutional plea bargain).
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counseled plea is presumptively valid." 6 ' In the absence of counsel, a
plea bargain would likely not be voluntary if it was obtained through
"threats or violence . . . [,] any direct or implied promises, however
slight, [or through] the exertion of any improper influence. ... "268 Fur-
thermore, pursuant to the "intelligence" requirement, the plea is to be
made with "sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences."269 In this respect, an individual entering into a plea
agreement without the assistance of counsel must possess "an under-
standing of the law in relation to the facts."2 70 Additionally, in order for
a trial judge to accept such a plea, the record must reflect "an affirmative
showing that it was intelligent and voluntary," 27 1 as "[i]gnorance,
incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats
might be a perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality."27 2 If the individual
is represented by counsel, however, even a flawed understanding of the
facts and circumstances of the case is sufficient provided that the deci-
sion to plead is "based on [counsel's] reasonably competent advice
"273
Particularly in light of the Filip Memo and the proposed changes to
the Organizational Guidelines, corporations may not have the benefit (or
at least the full benefit) of counsel in agreeing to DPAs or NPAs.
Although the Filip Memo states that corporations need not waive attor-
ney-client privilege in order to demonstrate cooperation, corporations
are still required to provide the government with "relevant facts," which
may ultimately include attorney work product or attorney-client commu-
nications.274 Prosecutors also need not seek approval prior to demanding
and obtaining this information. 2 75 Additionally, the Filip Memo suggests
that corporations use non-attorney personnel to conduct internal investi-
gations, despite the fact that lawyers are much more effective than non-
lawyers in undertaking internal investigations, determining whether any
violations of law have taken place, and evaluating potential remedial
measures. 276
Moreover, under the proposed amendments to the Organizational
Guidelines, the cooperation requirement may effectively be triggered
before the government initiates any investigation into a corporation's
267. Blank, supra note 266, at 2019; see also Brady, 397 U.S. at 754-55.
268. Bran v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897).
269. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
270. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
271. Boykin v. United States, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
272. Id. at 242-43.
273. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970).
274. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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potentially criminal activities. 277 As a result, the corporation may have
little or no understanding of the charges against it even while it begins to
undertake measures in order to cooperate with the government, such as
hiring an independent monitor to oversee modifications to the corpora-
tion's compliance and ethics program.
Thus, even if DPAs and NPAs are compared to plea bargains, con-
stitutional concerns regarding the requirements of these agreements are
not lessened given the comparative absence of advice of counsel. Addi-
tionally, unlike plea bargains, DPAs and NPAs are not submitted to a
judge for approval, thereby depriving corporations of any semblance of
"judicial review" of the agreement. Finally, the third constitutional con-
cern relating to DPAs and NPAs-that provisions allowing for the gov-
ernment's unilateral determination of breach could violate corporations'
due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments-is not
lessened even if DPAs and NPAs are compared to plea bargains.
The notion that corporations should be treated like persons under
the Constitution is not new. 2 78 And the majority's opinion in Citizens
United further substantiates the idea that corporations should be afforded
the same rights as natural persons; 279 although corporate personhood is a
convenient legal fiction, "this is still a fiction that we embrace to facili-
tate protection of the rights of individuals."280
In view of this understanding, the government's current treatment
of corporate criminality and its use of DPAs and NPAs are highly prob-
lematic. Specifically, provisions of DPAs and NPAs that mandate corpo-
277. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
278. See Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) ("The Court does not
wish to hear argument ... [regarding] whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, applies to ... corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does."); see
also First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) (holding that artificial persons
are protected from denial of "liberty," which includes their First Amendment rights); Larry E.
Ribstein, Corporate Political Speech, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 109, 123 (1992) (stating that
corporations have "the legal attributes of a 'person'").
279. Prior to Citizens United, a corporation had been held to possess most of the same
constitutional rights as natural persons. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784 (holding that a
corporation has the First Amendment right of free speech); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76
(1906) (concluding that the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures applies to corporations); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28
(1889) (noting that a corporation is entitled to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments); Santa Clara Cnty., 118 U.S. at 396 (stating that a corporation is entitled to equal
protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment).
280. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Citizens United, Corporate Personhood, and Nexus of Contracts
Theory, PROFESSORBRAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 21, 2010, 3:30 PM) http://www.professorbainbridge.
com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/citizens-united-corporate-personhood-and-nexus-of-cont
racts-theory.html. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the
Corporation, 4 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 95, 132 (1995).
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rations' cooperation with the government and acceptance of
responsibility, and give the government the sole discretion of determin-
ing whether the DPA or NPA has been breached may have to be altered
or eliminated from use altogether in the wake of Citizens United, lest
they be declared unconstitutional.
Judicial oversight over DPAs and NPAs may also have to be imple-
mented to remedy some issues relating to the problematic provisions of
these agreements and to bring some fairness into the DPA and NPA
agreement process. Although the submission of every DPA and NPA to
a court for approval28 1 may seem burdensome, courts review and
approve untold numbers of plea bargains on a daily basis. Reviewing the
DPAs and NPAs of a relatively small number of corporations that are
facing indictment would not add greatly to courts' current criminal case
loads, but it would likely lessen prosecutor overreaching and eliminate
many (if not all) constitutional concerns bound up with DPAs and
NPAs. Courts need not involve themselves with the day-to-day imple-
mentation of these agreements, but could limit their intervention to
instances where the government declares a unilateral breach of the DPA
or NPA. In such cases, courts could provide corporations with an oppor-
tunity to be heard on this point and make a final and controlling determi-
nation on the issue of breach, thereby affording corporations due process
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
CONCLUSION
The effect of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Citizens
United reaches beyond the realm of the First Amendment. Viewed in
light of the Court's traditional understanding that corporations are con-
sidered to be "persons" under the Constitution, the majority's suggestion
in Citizens United that corporations are equal to human beings, at least
under the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause, likely affects the way
that corporations' alleged criminal conduct is investigated by the gov-
ernment and the manner in which the government addresses corporate
misconduct. Specifically, a number of standard conditions currently
included in deferred-prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agree-
ments may have to be altered or eliminated altogether in response to the
humanization of the corporate entity following Citizens United. Further,
the element of judicial oversight may also have to be introduced to bring
some fairness into the DPA and NPA negotiation process. Without ques-
tion, these changes would greatly alter the landscape of corporate crimi-
nal liability in the United States.
281. In a manner that would be similar to the submission of a plea bargain for a court's review.
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